Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor by Forman, Jonathan Barry
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 2
Spring 1988
Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to
a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor
Jonathan Barry Forman
University of Oklahoma College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan B. Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor, 16 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
41 (2017) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol16/iss1/2
IMPROVING THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT:
TRANSITION TO A WAGE SUBSIDY CREDIT FOR THE
WORKING POORt
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN*
Millions of American families have incomes that fall below the
poverty line. Of these, many families are poor despite the fact that at
least one member of these families works during the year. In this
article, Professor Forman examines one tool in the fight against
poverty, the earned income credit. Professor Forman examines the
history of the credit and its shortcomings and then suggests ways in
which the credit could be improved to better serve the working poor.
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IMPROVING THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT:
TRANSITION TO A WAGE SUBSIDY CREDIT FOR THE
WORKING POOR
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN
O NE OF the real travesties of our economic system is that so many
Americans work in jobs that do not pay enough to enable them
to bring their families over the poverty line. Indeed, of the 32.4 mil-
lion people who were below the poverty line in 1986,1 more than eight
million worked during the year.2 Of these working poor, more than
two million worked full-time for fifty to fifty-two weeks during that
year.'
A partial explanation for the hardships faced by the working poor
stems from the fact that some 6.7 million workers now earn the mini-
mum wage. 4 In 1988 the minimum wage is $3.35 per hour.' Thus, a
wage-earner working 2,000 hours a year6 at the minimum wage would
earn just $6,700 per year, far short of the $11,650 poverty guideline
for a family of four. 7
Through the years, dozens of programs have been adopted to help
solve the problem of poverty in America. 8 Unfortunately, relatively
few programs have been geared towards helping the working poor,
despite the fact that there seems to be almost universal agreement
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 157,
MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAMIES AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1986
(ADVANCE DATA FROM TIH MARCH 1987 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 3, 23) (Table 15) (1987).
2. Id. at 31 (Table 18).
3. Id.
4. Clark, Raising the Floor, 19 NAT'L J. 702 (1987).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1982).
6. An individual working 52 weeks a year, 40 hours a week, would actually work 2,080
hours a year. Throughout this article, a 2,000-hour work year is assumed in order to make the
computa-tions and analyses simpler to understand.
7. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Notice of Annual Update of the Pov-
erty Income Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 4213, 4214 (1988) [hereinafter Poverty Income Guidelines].
8. One recent study determined that there were 59 major federal welfare programs. U.S.
DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL Low INCOME OPPORTUNITY GROUP, UP FROM DEPENDENCY: A NEw
NATIONAL PUBLIC ASSISTANCE STRATEGY 10, 11-13 (Table 1) (1986) (report to the President as-
sessing the American welfare system and proposing a basic change in public assistance policy)
[hereinafter UP FROM DEPENDENCY]. Another study catalogued 74 public programs offering cash
and non-cash benefits to people of limited income. V. BURKE, CASH AND NONCASH BENEFITS FOR
PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA, FY
1983-1985 (Cong. Res. Serv. Rep. No. 86-161 EPW 1986).
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that it is appropriate for the government to do so. 9 One modest fed-
eral program that is geared to help the working poor is the earned
income credit.l0
For 1988, the earned income credit provides certain1 low-income
families with a tax credit of up to $874 per year. 12 The earned income
credit is refundable: if the amount of the credit exceeds a family's
income tax liability, the Treasury will refund the balance. 3 Also,
rather than having to wait until the following year to claim the cur-
rent year's credit on its income tax return, an eligible family may
elect to receive advance payment of its expected earned income credit
in its pay checks throughout the year.14
Since its adoption in 1975,11 the earned income credit has become
an increasingly important program for the working poor. 16 The
earned income credit is claimed by more than six million families.'
7
For federal government fiscal year 1989, the earned income credit is
expected to result in tax subsidies and outlays of almost $5.5 billion. 8
9. See, e.g., AMERICAN PUB. WELFARE ASS'N, INVESTING IN POOR FAMILIES AND THEIR
CHILDREN: A MATTER OF COMMITMENT, PART I: ONE CHILD IN FOUR (1986) [hereinafter ONE
CHILD IN FOUR]; LADDERS OUT OF POVERTY: A REPORT OF THE PROJECT ON THE WELFARE FAMI-
LIES, under the co-chairmanship of Governor Bruce Babbitt of Arizona and Arthur Flemming (J.
A. Meyer ed. 1986) [hereinafter LADDERS OUT OF POVERTY]. Cf. Whitman, America's Hidden
Poor, 104(1) U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 1988, at 18.
10. I.R.C. § 32 (1988) (Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to provisions codified in
Title 26 of the United States Code (1988) will be cited herein as sections of the Internal Revenue
Code).
11. The credit is available only to low-income married individuals filing joint returns who
are entitled to a dependency exemption for a child, surviving spouses, and heads of households
with a child or descendant. I.R.C. § 32(c) (1988). Thus, single individuals and married couples
without dependents are not entitled to receive the earned income credit.
12. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
13. I.R.C. § 6401(b) (1988).
14. I.R.C. § 3507 (1988).
15. See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1989, pt. 5, at 130-31 (1988) [hereinafter 1989 BUDGET]; STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SEss., DATA AND MATERIALS RELATED TO WEL-
FARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN 241-243 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter WELFARE
PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIs wrrT CHILDREN]; STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., IST
SESS., FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF INDIVIDUALS BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL 6 (Table 2)
(Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT].
17. Selected Statistical Series, 1970-1988, in U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, 7(3) STATIS-
TICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 77, 82 (Table 2) (1988); See also Weber & Paris, Individual Income
Tax Returns for 1986: Selected Characteristics from the Taxpayer Usage Study, in U.S. INTER-
NAL REVENUE SERVICE, 7(1) STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN 1, 10 (Table 5) (1987); BURKE, supra
note 8, at 68-69; FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 6 (Table 2).
18. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 16 (SPECIAL ANALYSES, pt. G, at 44-45 (Table G-2)). To
the extent that the amount of the earned income credit exceeds a recipient's tax liability and is
refundable, the refundable portion is treated as an outlay under budget procedures. See, e.g.,
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This Article will evaluate the structure of the earned income credit
and will suggest methods for its improvement. My thesis is that the
earned income credit can form the basis for an effective antipoverty
program for the working poor. This analysis is particularly appropri-
ate now as welfare reform is once again in the limelight of public
policy consideration. 9
Section I examines the history of the earned income credit. Section
II examines the present operation of the earned income credit and of
the mechanism for advance payment of the earned income credit to
eligible recipients. I then examine in section III the mechanics of vari-
ous hypothetical income transfer programs for the working poor. In
particular, I compare wage subsidy proposals with negative income
tax and income subsidy proposals. Finally, in section IV I explore the
changes that are needed to convert the earned income credit into an
effective antipoverty program for the working poor.
I. HISTORY OF THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT
Although not adopted until 1975,20 the earned income credit grew
out of the welfare reform efforts of the late 1960's and early 1970's.
In this section I outline the debate over welfare reform and the ori-
gins of the earned income credit and trace the expansion of the
earned income credit from its initial adoption through the major
changes recently made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986.21
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SEss., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 28 (Comm. Print 1987) [hereinafter EXPLANATION OF 'rIEn 1986
ACT].
19. On December 16, 1987, the House of Representatives passed a $5 billion welfare reform
bill. H.R. 1720, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). On June 16, 1988 similar legislation passed the
Senate. S. 1511, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 134 CONG. REc. S8008 (daily ed. June 16, 1988). Also,
a number of major welfare studies have been issued recently. See, e.g., NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S
Ass'N, POLICY ON WELFARE REFORM (1987); M. NOVAK, A COMMUNITY OF SELF-RELIANCE: THE
NEW CONSENSUS ON FAMILY AND WELFARE (1987) (report of the Working Seminar on the Family
and American Welfare Policy); ONE CHILD IN FouR, supra note 9; U.S. DoMEsTic POLICY COUN-
CIL WORKING GROUP ON THE FAMILy, THE FAMLY: PRESERVING AMERICA'S FUTURE (1986); LAD-
DERS OUT OF POVERTY, supra note 9; TASK FORCE ON POVERTY AND WELFARE, A SOCIAL
CONTRACT: RETHINKING THE NATURE AND PURPosE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE (1986) (report of the
Task Force on Poverty and Welfare submitted to New York Governor Mario M. Cuomo) [here-
inafter Cuomo]; UP FROM DEPENDENCY, supra note 8; C. A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERI-
CAN SOCIAL POLICY 1950-1980 (1984). See also Roberts & Schulzinger, Toward Reform of the
Welfare System: Is Consensus Emerging? 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 2 (May 1987).
20. See infra notes 59-76 and accompanying text.
21. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 111, 100 Stat. 2085, 2107-09 (codified
primarily at I.R.C. § 32 (1988)).
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A. Background
With the publication of The Other America22 in the early 1960's,
Americans slowly came to realize that there was another America-
an America that included poor whites in Appalachia, poor blacks in
the South, and poor Indians on reservations. Poverty increasingly
came to be viewed as a social problem and as calling for overall re-
form of the welfare system. For example, in 1962, economist Milton
Friedman proposed replacing existing welfare programs with a nega-
tive income tax. 23 Basically, a negative income tax is a system of cash
grants to families in which the amount of a family's grant varies in-
versely with the amount of that family's income. Advocates of a neg-
ative income tax generally have argued that such cash grants to the
poor would be more efficient and less costly than non-cash programs
such as food stamps and public housing.2 4
As concern grew about poverty in America, President Lyndon B.
Johnson went so far as to declare a "War on Poverty."" Also, in
January of 1968, President Johnson appointed a blue-ribbon Com-
mission on Income Maintenance Programs to study the income needs
of all Americans, to examine all existing government programs de-
signed to meet those needs, and to make recommendations for con-
structive improvements.26 The Commission concluded that the
welfare system was badly in need of reform, 27 and recommended the
development of a direct federal cash transfer program to make pay-
ments to all members of the population with income needs.2 8 For ex-
ample, under the Commission's proposal, the federal cash transfer
program would have ensured an income of $2,400 a year to a family
of four. 29 Essentially, the Commission recommended adoption of a
federal negative income tax.
22. M. HARRINGTON, TIE OTHER AMERICA (1962). See also E. LIEBOW, TALLY'S CORNER
(1967).
23. M. FREEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 174-75 (1962). See also C. GREEN, NEGATIVE
TAXES AND THE POVERTY PROBLEM (1967); Lampman, Approaches to the Reduction of Poverty,
55 Am. ECON. REv. 521 (1965); LAMPmAN, Prognosis for Poverty, in NAT'L TAX A., PROC. OF
THE FIFTY-SEVENTH ANNUAL CONF. (1964); Tobin, Improving the Economic Status of the Negro,
94 J. DAEDALUS 878 (1965); Tobin, Pechman & Mieszkowski, Is a Negative Income Tax Practi-
cal? 77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).
24. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
25. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, PuB. PAPERS 112 (Jan. 8,
1964); see also Special Message to the Congress Proposing a Nationwide War on the Sources of
Poverty, PuB. PAPERS 375 (Mar. 16, 1964).
26. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE, POVERTY AMID PLENTY: THE REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE ii (1969).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 57-63.
29. Id.
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President Richard M. Nixon also favored welfare reform. On Au-
gust 8, 1969, in a television address, President Nixon outlined a plan
to ensure an adequate income for all American families.30 That plan,
known as the Family Assistance Plan,3' also was essentially a negative
income tax for families. It would have provided a cash grant of up to
$1,600 per year for a family of four with no outside income. 2 Bene-
fits would have varied with family size and would have been phased
out as family income increased." In 1970, a modified version of the
Family Assistance Plan passed the House of Representatives3 4 but
was rejected in conference with the Senate.35
B. Early Tax Credit Proposals
Despite the initial rejection of the Family Assistance Plan, the
Nixon Administration and Congress continued to work for welfare
reform. Out of those efforts, the earned income credit emerged.
1. A Work Bonus for Low-Income Workers
A revised version of the Family Assistance Plan was proposed by
the Nixon Administration, and introduced in the House as part of the
proposed Social Security Amendments of 1971 .36 In modified form,
the Family Assistance Plan passed the House on June 22, 1971.1 7 As
part of its counterproposal, the Senate Finance Committee's substi-
tute for the House Bill included the first semblance of an earned in-
come credit.3"
30. Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, PuB. PAPERS 637 (Aug. 8, 1969); see also
Special Message to Congress on Welfare Reform, PUB. PAPERS 647 (Aug. 11, 1969).
31. The proposal was introduced in Congress as the Family Assistance Act of 1969, H.R.
14173, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1969), and was reintroduced in the following Congress as the Fam-
ily Assistance Act of 1970, H.R. 16311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
32. Family Assistance Act of 1970, supra note 31, at § 442.
33. Id. §§ 442, 446.
34. 116 CONG. REC. 12105-06 (1970).
35. The details are discussed in D.P. MOYNIH-AN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME
(1973).
36. The proposal was included in Title IV of The Social Security Amendments of 1971,
H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4989.
37. 117 CONG. REc. 21,463 (1971).
38. H.R. 1, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 534 (1972); see also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
92D CONG., 2D SESS., SOCIAL SECURITY AND WELFARE REFORM: SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL PRO-
VISIONS OF H.R. 1 AS DETERMINED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE 74 (Comm. Print 1972) [here-
inafter PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF H.R. 11; STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 92D CONG., 2D
SEss., H.R. 1: SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS OF 1972, OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATE DEBATE
7-8 (Comm. Print 1972).
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The Senate Finance Committee's proposal called for a "work bo-
nus" to supplement the wages of low-income taxpayers.3 9 The work
bonus was to have been equal to 10% of the wages of eligible low-
income workers who headed families.40 Generally, families were to
have been eligible for the bonus if the annual wage income of the
husband and wife combined was $4,000 or less. 4 ' Only those low-in-
come workers in regular employment who headed families would
have been eligible for the work bonus.4 2 Because of technical difficul-
ties that the Committee was not then able to work out, the proposal
did not cover low-income, self-employed individuals.4 1
The 10% work bonus was to have been administered by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service and was to have operated essentially as a refund-
able tax credit of up to $400 (10% times $4,000 maximum wages) per
family. For families whose combined wage income of the husband
and wife exceeded $4,000, the maximum $400 work bonus was to
have been reduced by one-quarter (25 percent) of the amount by
which their wages exceeded $4,000. With this phase-out, the tax
credit would have been eliminated once a family's total income
reached $5,600.4
The proposal also provided that eligible individuals would have
been entitled to apply for advance payments of the credit on a quar-
terly basis. 45 Under this procedure, at any time after completion of
the first calendar quarter, individuals could have applied for one-
quarter of the tax credit that they would have been entitled to receive
based on their earnings for the first quarter and projected earnings
for the subsequent quarters. A similar procedure could have been fol-
lowed for subsequent quarters. 46 To eliminate de minimis claims, no
39. PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF H.R. 1, supra note 38, at 74.
40. Id.
41. Id. The work bonus was to have applied only to wages covered by social security or
railroad retirement. Id. See also S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 425-26 (1972). A special
provision would have enabled domestics, yardmen, and other similar business employees earning
less than $50 a quarter (and thus not covered by social security) also to qualify for the work
bonus. See PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF H.R. 1, supra note 38, at 74.
42. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 41, at 425.
43. Id. at 426.
44. 118 CoNG. REc. 33,011 (Sept. 30, 1972) (remarks of Sen. Long).
45. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 41, at 425. The details of this proposed advance payment
feature were explained more fully by the Senate Finance Committee in connection with its later
proposed tax credit for low-income workers, discussed infra at notes 51-58 and accompanying
text. See S. REP. No. 553, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20-22 (1973).
46. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 41, at 425. In this regard, the refund for the fourth quar-
ter tax credit was to have been applied for in connection with the filing of a return after the end
of the year, or claimed as a credit in the same manner as an overpayment of income tax. At the
end of the year, any individual who had received advance refund payments would have been
1988] EARNED INCOME CREDIT
quarterly advance refund payment of less than $30 was to have been
made. 4'
Because the work bonus proposal did not vary benefits by family
size, but only by income, the Senate Finance Committee expressed
the belief that the proposal would have avoided any economic incen-
tive for recipients to have additional children. Also, because the pro-
posal had a graduated phase-out of the amount of the payment as
income rose above $4,000, the Committee believed that it would not
have created a work disincentive. 4 The proposal was expected to cost
about $1 billion per year and was expected to have provided work
bonus benefits to 5.5 million families. The Senate Finance Commit-
tee's work bonus proposal was approved by the full Senate, 49 but no
agreement was reached in conference with the House. 0
2. The Proposed Tax Credit for Low-Income Workers
In 1973, the Senate Finance Committee refined its work bonus pro-
posal into a proposed "Tax Credit for Low-Income Workers with
Families," which was included in its version of the Social Security
Amendments of 1973.11 Like its predecessor (the work bonus pro-
posal), the tax credit for low-income workers would have entitled a
wage earner to receive a tax credit of up to $400 per year.12 The Sen-
required to file a return with the IRS setting forth the amount of income received during the year
and the amount received as advance refund payments. If the IRS determined that an individual
received advance refund payments in excess of the entitled tax credit for the year, the IRS was
required to notify the individual of the amount due and to collect that amount. The IRS would
have been authorized to collect the excess advance refund payments by withholding from future
tax credit advance refund payments that the individual might have otherwise been entitled to
receive, by treating the excess payments as a deficiency under the tax laws or by entering into an
agreement with the individual providing for repayment. For example, the IRS would have been
authorized to use the offset authority provided in I.R.C § 6402(a). S. REP. No. 553, supra note
45, at 22.
47. S. REp. No. 1230, supra note 41, at 425. Of course, no advance refund payment was to
have been made for any quarter to an individual who expected to receive too much income for
the entire year to have been eligible for a tax credit for the year. Cf. S. REP. No. 553, supra note
45, at 22.
48. S. REP. No. 1230, supra note 41, at 425-26.
49. 118 CoNG. REc. 33,014 (1972).
50. H.R. REp. No. 1605, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADM iN. NEWs 5370.
51. H.R. 3153, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 112 (1973). See also S. RaP. No. 553, supra note 45,
at 20-22.
52. S. REP. No. 553, supra note 45, at 20-22. Generally, only wages subject to social secu-
rity were considered for purposes of determining the credit. Thus, self-employed people would
not have been eligible for the credit for the social security taxes that they paid on self-employ-
ment income. On the other hand, low-income workers who paid railroad retirement taxes would
have been treated as if they paid social security taxes for purposes of determining the credit. Id.
at 20 n.1.
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ate Finance Committee report accompanying the bill emphasized that
the tax credit provision would have had the effect of refunding to
low-income workers with children a large portion of the social secu-
rity taxes then paid by them."
Similar to the work bonus proposal, the amount of the proposed
tax credit was to have been reduced by one-quarter of the amount by
which a family's total annual income exceeded $4,000. 54 In determin-
ing when an individual's income exceeded $4,000 for purposes of the
credit, "income" was defined as including all of an individual's ad-
justed gross income, increased by certain income specifically excluded
from the income tax base and by certain transfer payments and pay-
ments for the general support of the individual (such as social secu-
rity, welfare, veterans payments, and food stamps; but not transfer
payments for medicare, medicaid, and the furnishing of prosthetic
devices)." Also, like the work bonus proposal, individuals eligible to
receive the proposed credit would have been allowed to apply for ad-
vance refund payments of the credit on a quarterly basis.5 6 The Sen-
ate Finance Committee's tax credit for low-income workers with
families was approved by the full Senate, 57 but it was not included in
the 1973 legislation. 5s
C. The Earned Income Tax Credit
1. The Earned Income Credit and The Tax Deduction Act of 1975
In 1975, the economy was stagnating, and both the Ford Adminis-
tration and Congress wanted to enact a tax cut to stimulate the econ-
omy. The House Ways and Means Committee for the first time
adopted a proposal for a refundable tax credit for low-income work-
ers.5 9 The proposal called for a refundable "earned income tax
credit" equal to 5% of earned income up to $4,000, for a maximum
credit of $200. The credit was to have been phased out as earned in-
come (or adjusted gross income, if greater) increased from $4,000 to
$6,000. Since the tax cut was intended primarily as a short-term stim-
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id. at 21.
55. Id.
56. Id. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
57. 119 CONG. REc. 38,975 (1973).
58. The Social Security Benefits Increase Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, 87 Stat. 947
(1974).
59. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1975). See also H.R. REP. No. 19, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 9-10, 29-31 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58, reprinted in 1975 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD?,w. NEws 122, 124.
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ulus to the economy, the credit was to apply only for tax years begin-
ning in 1975.60
The House Ways and Means Committee's proposed earned income
tax credit was to have applied to all employees, not just those with
dependent children, and also to taxpayers with earnings from self-
employment. 6' Special anti-abuse rules were to have applied to indivi-
duals employed by members of their family and to those under age
eighteen. 62 According to the House Ways and Means Committee's re-
port accompanying the bill, the proposed credit was intended to pro-
vide relief for low-income families that had been hurt the most by
rising food and energy costs. Believing that low-income people would
spend a large fraction of their increased disposable incomes, the
Committee expected the credit to stimulate the economy. 6 The Com-
mittee also believed that it was appropriate to use the income tax sys-
tem to offset the impact of social security taxes on low-income
people. 64 The Committee estimated that the proposed earned income
tax credit would have cost about $2.9 billion per year. 65 The House
approved the proposal on February 27, 1975. 66
The Senate Finance Committee significantly revised the House's
earned income tax credit proposal to make it conform with the work-
bonus concept previously reported by the Senate Finance Commit-
tee. 67 Accordingly, the Senate Finance Committee proposal called for
a tax credit of 10016 of earned income up to a maximum of $400. The
amount of the credit was to have been phased out as earned income
(or adjusted gross income, if greater) increased from $4,000 to
$8,000. Furthermore, the Senate Finance Committee proposal would
have limited the credit only to those taxpayers with dependent chil-
dren. 6 As in the House Bill, this proposal was to have applied only to
60. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 204 (1975).
61. H.R. REP. No. 19, supra note 59, at 29-30. This broad definition of earned income
included some types of wages and other income that were not even subject to the social security
tax, such as government employee wages which were then not subject to social security taxation.
Id.
62. Id. at 30. In general, these special rules were intended to avoid any incentive to establish
artificial employment arrangements to obtain eligibility for the credit. Id.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 29.
65. Id. at 31.
66. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1975). See also 121 CoNo. REc. 4658 (1975).
67. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 203 (1975); S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11,
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEWS 54, 63-64.
68. S. REP. No. 36, supra note 67, at 11. According to its report, the Senate Finance Com-
mittee agreed with the House that it was appropriate to use the income tax system to offset the
impact of the social security taxes on low-income people in 1975 by adopting a refundable in-
come tax credit against earned income. The Committee saw that the refundable credit would
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tax years beginning in 1975.69 The Senate Finance Committee pro-
posal was approved by the full Senate on March 21, 1975,70 and
would have cost about $1.5 billion per year. 7'
The Conference Committee basically adopted the Senate version of
the earned income tax credit. 72 The earned income tax credit finally
became law for calendar year 1975 on'March 29, 1975. 73 As enacted,
the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 allowed a refundable credit equal to
10% of a taxpayer's earned income for the taxable year which did not
exceed $4,000 (a maximum credit of $400). The $400 maximum credit
was reduced $1 for each $10 of income in excess of $4,000. Thus, the
credit was completely phased out at an income level of $8,000. Only
individuals who maintained a household in the United States for
themselves and for a dependent child or student were eligible to claim
the credit, and, in the case of married people, the earned income
credit was available only if a joint return was filed. 74 As enacted, the
earned income credit did not contain the advance refund payment
feature that earlier had been suggested by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee. 75 Six-and-one-half million families with dependent children,
or approximately 20 million individuals, were expected to be eligible
for the credit in calendar year 1975.76
2. Subsequent Changes in the Earned Income Credit
The Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975 extended the earned income
credit through June 30, 1976. 77 The Act also added a provision which
stimulate the economy because low-income people could be expected to spend a large fraction of
their increased disposable incomes.
The Committee emphasized, however, that it believed that the most significant objective of the
provision was to assist in encouraging people to obtain employment, thereby reducing the unem-
ployment rate and reducing the welfare rolls. Id. at 33. As a result, the Committee did not agree
with the House that the earned income credit should be available to all in,dividuals who had
earned income regardless of marital or family status. Instead, the Committee believed that since
federal welfare programs applied primarily to married couples with dependent children, it was in
this area that its proposal could be most effective. Thus, while the House Bill would have
granted the credit to students and retired individuals with low earned income, the Senate Finance
Committee Bill would have limited the credit primarily to taxpayers with dependent children. Id.
69. H.R. Rap. No. 120, supra note 59, at 58-59.
70. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. § 203 (1975); 121 CONG. Rc. 8133 (1975).
71. S. REp. No. 36, supra note 67, at 11.
72. H.R. RP. No. 120, supra note 59, at 59.
73. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30-32 (1975) (codi-
fied primarily at I.R.C. § 43 (1975)). See also H.R. REp. No. 120, supra note 59, at 59; S. REP.
No. 42, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1979).
74. S. REP. No. 36, supra note 67, at 11.
75. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
76. S. REP. No. 42, supra note 73, at 28.
77. Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-164 § 2(c), (d), (f), 89 Stat. 970, 971-
72 (1975) (codified at I.R.C. § 43 (1975)).
EARNED INCOME CREDIT
required that the amount of any earned income credit received would
be disregarded as income for purposes of determining the continuing
eligibility (and benefit amount) for individuals and children who re-
ceived benefits or assistance under other federal or federally financed
programs.7
In 1976, the Senate Finance Committee proposed to make the
earned income credit permanent. 9 In the report accompanying its tax
bill for that year, the Committee emphasized its view that the earned
.income credit provided a strong work incentive for those limited to
jobs that paid low wages and that the credit provided desperately
needed tax relief to a hard-pressed group faced with high food and
energy prices and subject to social security taxes80
As enacted, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 extended the earned in-
come credit only through calendar years 1976 and 1977.81 An amend-
ment provided that the refunds resulting from this credit would be
disregarded in determining eligibility for or benefits under federal or
federally assisted aid programs for those people who are recipients of
benefits under the program in the month before they receive their re-
fund. Another amendment eliminated the requirement that a parent
must be entitled to actually claim a personal exemption for at least
one child in order to claim the earned income credit. Instead, a re-
quirement was added that the parent simply maintain a household for
a child who is either under nineteen or a student .82 The earned income
credit was extended through 1978 by the Tax Reduction and Simplifi-
cation Act of 1977.83
The earned income credit was finally made a permanent part of the
Internal Revenue Code by the Revenue Act of 1978. That Act sim-
78. H.R. REP. No. 739, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1975); see also S. REP. No. 42, supra
note 73, at 27-28.
79. S. REP. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
McN. NEWS 3439, 3453.
80. Id. at 119, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3554.
81. I.R.C. § 43 (1976). See also S. REP. No. 1236, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 429-30, reprinted in
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADma. NEws 4118, 4139-40; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
94TH CONG., 2D SEss., GENrERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 111-14
(Comm. Print 1976).
82. S. REP. No. 1236, supra note 81, at 429-30. See also S. REP. No. 938, supra note 79, at
119-20.
83. Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 103(b), 91 Stat. 126, 139 (1977) (codified at former I.R.C. § 43
(1977)). See also S. REP. No. 66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADKN. NEWS 185, 256; H.R. REP. No. 27, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 61-62 (1977); H.R.
REP. No. 263, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
287,289.
84. Pub. L. No. 95-600, §§ 103-104, 98 Stat. 2768, 2771-73 (1978) (codified at former
I.R.C. § 43 (1978)). See also H.R. REP. No. 1800, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-200, reprinted in
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plified the determination of the amount of, and eligibility for, the
credit.85 It also extended the credit to 10076 of the first $5,000 of
earned income (a maximum tax credit of $500), and raised the income
range over which the credit phased out from $6,000 to $10,000 of
adjusted gross income (or, if higher, earned income)., 6
The Revenue Act of 1978 also provided that, after July 1, 1979,
employees could elect to have advance payments of the earned in-
come credit added to their paychecks each pay period through the
normal withholding mechanism. 87 The amount of the advance pay-
ment was to be determined from tables which would take into ac-
count the amount of wages paid and whether an employee's spouse
was also claiming advance payments. Employers would reduce their
liability for income tax withholding and FICA taxes for the aggregate
amount of advance payments made to employees in any pay period.88
Finally, effective January. 1, 1980, the Revenue Act of 1978 required
that the amount of the credit be treated as earned income in deter-
mining benefits under other federal and federally aided assistance
programs.8 9 The Senate Finance Committee report indicates that
treating the credit as earned income for purposes of other federal and
federally aided assistance programs was intended to make the earned
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADbiN. NEws 7198, 7206-07; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
96TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERALL EXPLANATION OF THE REvENUE ACT OF 1978, at 50-55 (Comm.
Print 1979).
85. For example, the Act made it possible for taxpayers and the IRS to determine the
amount of the credit under tables prescribed by the Secretary. See H.R. REP. No. 1445, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7046, 7078-81; H.R.
REP. No. 1800, supra note 84, at 199-200.
86. H.R. REP. No. 1800, supra note 84, at 199-200.
87. Pub. L. No. 95-600, supra note 84, at § 105 (codified at former I.R.C. §§ 43, 3507
(1978)); H.R. REP. No. 1800, supra note 84, at 200.
88. H.R. REP. No. 1800, supra note 84, at 200. See also Hayes, Coping with the Advance
Payment of the Earned Income Credit, 57 TAXEs 745 (1979). According to the Senate Finance
Committee report, the committee believed that the credit would work more effectively if indivi-
duals were able to receive it during the year that they were working. The committee also believed
that advance payment of the credit would increase the work incentive that was intended to be
provided by the credit. Therefore, the committee proposed a mechanism for advance payments
of the credit to be made by employers to eligible employees. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADxmr. NEws 6761, 6815.
89. Pub. L. No. 95-600, supra note 84, at § 105, as amended by The Technical Corrections
Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-222, § 101(a)(2), 94 Stat. 194, 195 (codified former I.R.C. § 43
(1978)). See also S. REP. No. 498, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMaN. NEws 316, 325-26. In this regard, the Social Security Act was amended, effective
January 1, 1980, to provide specifically that the earned income credit and advance payments of
the credit would be treated as earned income for purposes of the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs. S. REP. No.
1263, supra note 88, at 52.
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income credit a more effective incentive to work and more of a disin-
centive for being on welfare. 90
The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 renumbered the earned income
credit as Section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Act also in-
creased the rate of the credit to 11 % of the first $5,000 of earned
income, thus raising the maximum credit to $550 per year.9' The Act
also raised the income range over which the credit would be phased
out from $6,500 to $11,000, for taxable years beginning after Decem-
ber 31, 1984.92 The Act also provided for a reduction in the amount
of credit allowed equal to the amount of a taxpayer's liability (if any)
for the alternative minimum tax. 93
3. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
In his 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan asked the
Secretary of the Treasury to develop and present a plan to simplify
the tax code by December 1984. 94 The Treasury Department submit-
ted its report on tax reform to President Reagan after his reelection. 95
That report called for, inter alia, simplification of the tax system and
reduction of the tax burden on the poor. The Treasury report recog-
nized that the earned income credit served to offset social security
and income taxes and provided work incentives for many low-income
families with dependents. 96 The Treasury report also noted that in-
creases in inflation had reduced both the number of families eligible
for the credit and the real amount of the credit for those who re-
mained eligible. 97 The Treasury report pointed out that while the Def-
icit Reduction Act of 1984 had increased the credit percentage,
maximum credit, and income limit for the credit, the new amounts
90. S. REP. No. 498, supra note 89, at 12.
91. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1042, 98 Stat. 494, 1043-44 (1984)
(codified primarily at I.R.C. § 32 (1988)). See also H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1254-55, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1445, 1942-43; STAFF OF JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION
ACT OF 1984, at 1160-61 (Comm. Print 1984).
92. H.R. REP. No. 861, supra note 91, at 1254. This resulted in a phase-out rate of 12.22%70.
I.R.C. § 32(b) (1984).
93. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 91, at 1160-61. This change was
made to ensure that individuals with low earned income but substantial investment income who
pay the alternative minimum tax rather than the regular income tax are ineligible for the credit.
Id. This change is codified at I.R.C. § 32(h) (1988).
94. Address before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, PUB. PAPERS 87,
99 (Jan. 25, 1984).
95. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH: THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, 3 vols. (1984).
96. Id. vol. 2, at 15.
97. Id.
1988]
56 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:41
were not indexed for inflation and so would remain fixed until
changed by legislation.98 Accordingly, to eliminate the need for peri-
odic legislative adjustments in the credit, the Treasury report recom-
mended that the maximum earned income credit amount and the
adjusted gross income and earned income phase-out limits, beginning
in 1985, be indexed to the current rate of inflation. 99
The President used the Treasury report as the basis for his Tax
Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity. 1° To
provide some compensation for the effect of past inflation on the
value of the earned income credit and on the number of families eligi-
ble for the credit, the President's proposal also called for increasing
the credit percentage and phasing it out at a higher income level. I 10
Also, to eliminate the need for periodic legislative adjustments to the
credit, the President's proposal called for indexing the maximum
earned income credit amount and the adjusted gross income and
earned income phase-out limits to inflation. 10 2
The President's proposal would have increased the earned income
credit to 14% of the first $5,000 of earned income, for a maximum
credit of $700. The maximum credit of $700 was to have been re-
duced by 10% of the excess of adjusted gross income or earned in-
come (whichever is greater) exceeding $6,500. Thus, the credit was to
have been eliminated when adjusted gross income or earned income
reached $13,500. Beginning in 1986, the maximum earned income
credit and the adjusted gross income or earned income limit were to
have been adjusted for inflation.103
The House Ways and Means Committee's version of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 proposed to increase and index the earned income
tax credit.1°4 The House Bill would have increased the earned income
credit to 14% of the first $5,000 of earned income (maximum credit
of $700), effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1,
98. Id.
99. Id. at 16.
100. Tm PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SN-
PLICITY (1985).
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. Id.
103. Id. The amount of the adjustment in a given calendar year would depend on the per-
centage increase in consumer prices for the previous fiscal year, as measured by the consumer
price index for all-urban consumers ("CPIU"). The proposal would have applied for taxable
years beginning on or after January 1, 1986. Adjustments for inflation for 1986 were to be based
on changes in the CPIU for the 1985 fiscal year. Id.
104. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong. 2d Sess. § 111 (1986). See also H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 94-95 (1985); H.R. REp. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 2, at 12, reprinted in 1986
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 4075, 4100-01.
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1986, and raised the income ceiling at which the credit was to have
been completely phased out to $13,500, effective for taxable years be-
ginning on or after January 1, 1986. The income phase-out range was
to have been raised from $9,000 to $16,000 for taxable years begin-
ning on or after January 1, 1987. The maximum amount of the credit
and the income phase-out range were to have been adjusted for infla-
tion occurring after August 31, 1984.105 The bill passed the full House
on December 17, 1985.106
The Senate followed the House Bill, except that the proposed in-
crease in the credit rate to 14%, and the proposed higher phase-out
range of $6,500 to $13,500 were to have been effective for taxable
years beginning on or after January 1, 1987. Also, the income phase-
out range was to have been raised from $10,000 to $17,000, effective
for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1988. In addition,
to promote use of the advance payment feature of the earned income
tax credit, the Senate Bill would have directed the Treasury to issue
regulations requiring employers to notify employees whose wages
were not subject to income tax withholding that they might be eligible
for a refundable earned income credit.10 7
As enacted, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 followed the Senate bill,
except that the base against which the increased 140%0 credit applies
was raised to $5,714 (increasing the maximum credit to $800).10s Also,
since 1987, the maximum amount of the credit and the phase-out in-
105. H.R. REP. No. 426, supra note 104, at 94-95. The committee recognized that the earned
income credit was intended to provide tax relief to low-income working individuals with children
and to improve incentives to work. Since its enactment in 1975, Congress periodically had in-
creased the maximum amount and the phase-out levels of the credit to offset the effects of infla-
tion and social security tax increases. The committee understood that further increases in the
maximum amount and phase-out level of the credit were necessary to offset past inflation and
increases in the social security tax. In addition, the committee believed that an automatic adjust-
ment to the credit to reflect future inflation should be provided, just as it is provided for the
personal exemption, the standard deduction, and rate brackets, to eliminate the reduction in the
real value of the credit caused by inflation. Id.
106. 131 CONG. REc. H12,826 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1985).
107. H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111 (1986). See also S. REP. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 43-44 (1986).
108. I.R.C. § 32 (1988). See also H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 104, vol. 2, at 12, 13 n.1;
EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 18, at 27-28.
The conference agreement clarifies the form of notice that must be given by an employer to
employees whose wages are exempt from withholding pursuant to the code. For example, this
exemption applies in the case of high school or college students who have summer jobs. H.R.
REP. No. 841, supra note 104, vol. 2, at 13.
Also, for taxable years beginning after 1989, self-employed individuals will be entitled to a
deduction equal to half the amount of self-employment taxes, but that deduction will not reduce
self-employment earnings for purposes of the earned income credit. See Social Security Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 124 (c)(4)(B), (d)(2), 97 Stat. 65, 90-91 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. 1 1983)).
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come range have been adjusted for inflation occurring after calendar
year 1984.'0 9 For 1988, the income phase-out level has been further
increased from $9,000 to $17,000, plus an adjustment for inflation
occurring after calendar year 1984.110 Changes in the earned income
credit made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were expected to cost
$15.3 billion over federal government Fiscal Years 1987 through
1991.11
II. OPERATION OF THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT
Section 32 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 provides that
qualifying low-income taxpayers may claim a tax credit equal to a
percentage of their earned income for the taxable year. To claim the
credit, a taxpayer must file an income tax return for the year." 2 For
1988, the maximum earned income credit that a taxpayer may claim
is $874.'" Unlike other credits for individuals,"1 4 the earned income
credit is a refundable tax credit; if the earned income tax credit ex-
ceeds the taxpayer's tax liability, the IRS will refund the difference." 5
A. The Credit Itself
This section discusses the rudimentary facets of the credit-how
much the credit is worth, who is eligible to receive it, and what con-
stitutes earned income. Later, I will discuss the mechanics of receiv-
ing advance payment of the credit.
1. Amount of the Earned Income Credit
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the amount of the credit
is equal to 14% of up to $5,714 of a taxpayer's earned income for the
109. I.R.C. § 32(i) (1988). See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
110. I.R.C. § 32(b), (i)(1988).
111. H.R. REP. No. 841, supra note 104, vol. 2, at 866. This includes both revenue losses
and increased outlays that result because the credit is refundable. Id. at 884; EXPLANATION OF
rHE 1986 ACT, supra note 18, at 27-28, 1359 (Table A-2).
112. United States Internal Revenue Service Form 1040 or Form 1040A must be used. U.S.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 596, THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT 2 (1987) [hereinafter
EARNED INCOME CREDIT]. The credit cannot be claimed on United States Internal Revenue Serv-
ice Form 1040EZ.
113. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 15, CIRCULAR E, EMPLOYER's TAX GUIDE
47 (Table 7) (1988) [hereinafter EMPLOYER's TAX GUImE].
114. For example, the credit for child and dependent care, I.R.C. § 21 (1988), the credit for
the elderly and the permanently and totally disabled, id. § 22, and the credit for interest on
certain home mortgages, id. § 25, are not refundable.
115. Id. § 6401(b). The amount of any refund of income tax is first used to offset any other
tax liabilities of the taxpayer, and then the balance is refunded to the taxpayer. Id. § 6402(a).
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year." 6 It also reduces the taxpayer's maximum potential credit by
10076 of the amount by which the taxpayer's earned income (or, if
greater, adjusted gross income) exceeds $9,000.1 7 Furthermore, the
base amount of earned income, $5,714, as well as the phase-out
floor, $9,000, and, consequently, the phase-out ceiling, $17,000, are
all indexed for inflation occurring after calendar year 1984.111 Each
year, the IRS publishes tables to help taxpayers" 9 and their
employers 120 determine the proper amount of a taxpayer's earned in-
come credit.
For 1988, eligible taxpayers with earned income (and adjusted
gross income) of no more than $6,235 may claim an earned income
credit equal to 14% of their earned income.' 2' An eligible taxpayer
with earned income greater than $6,235 and earned income (or ad-
justed gross income, if higher) not exceeding $9,836 is entitled to an
earned income credit of $874. 122 An eligible taxpayer with earned in-
come greater than $6,235 and earned income (or adjusted gross in-
come, if higher) greater than $9,836 is entitled to an earned income
credit of roughly $874, less 10% of any earned income (or adjusted
gross income, if higher) in excess of $9,836.123 Consequently, an oth-
erwise eligible taxpayer with earned income or adjusted gross income
of $18,566 or more is not entitled to any earned income credit. 24 Ad-
ditionally, the amount of any credit otherwise allowable is reduced by
an amount equal to the amount of a taxpayer's liability (if any) for
the alternative minimum tax. 125
2. Eligible Individuals
Only married taxpayers with a child, surviving spouses, and heads
of households with a child or descendant, are eligible for the credit. 26
116. Id. § 32(a) (1988).
117. Id. § 32(b) (1988). For 1987, the statutory phase-out floor was $6,500. Id.
118. Id. § 32(i) (1988).
119. See, e.g., EARNED INCOME CREDIT, supra note 112, at 8.
120. See, e.g., EMPLOYER's TAX GUmE, supra note 113, at 46-50.
121. Id. at 47 (Table 7).
122. Id. From Table 7 it can be seen that the maximum base amount after the adjustment for
inflation is roughly $6,235, for a maximum credit of $872.90 (14% x $6,235), which is rounded
up to $873 in the Table and apparently will be rounded up to $874 when individuals file their tax
returns. Id. at 12.
123. Id. at 46-50.
124. Id. at 47 (Table 7). You can apply the following equation: (873 - 10% x (Y - $9,836))
= 0, where Y is the higher of the taxpayer's earned income or adjusted gross income.
125. I.R.C. § 32(h) (1988).
126. Id. § 32(c)(1).
1988]
60 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:41
To claim the credit, a married taxpayer 27 must be entitled to claim a
personal exemption1 21 for a child or be so entitled but for a divorce or
separation decree. 129 Also, married taxpayers must file a joint return
to claim the credit.' 30 For married taxpayers filing a joint return, the
qualifying dependent must be the taxpayer's child.' Also, the child
must have the same principal place of abode as the individual for
more than one-half of the taxable year, and such abode must be in
the United States. 3 2
Similar rules apply to surviving spouses 33 and heads of house-
hold. 34 For heads of household, however, the child can be a son,
daughter, stepchild, legally adopted child, or a descendent; and the
taxpayer must generally be able to claim an exemption for the
child. 135 In addition, an individual is treated as a surviving spouse or
127. In general, a person is considered as married if married at the close of the taxable year.
Id. § 7703(a)(1) (1988). Even if the taxpayer's spouse dies during the taxable year, the taxpayer is
considered as married. Id. Legally separated taxpayers under a decree of divorce or of separate
maintenance are not considered as married. Id. § 7703(a)(2). Similarly, certain married indivi-
duals living apart from each other during the last six months of the taxable year and filing
separate returns are not considered as married. Id. § 7703(b).
128. See id. § 151.
129. Id. § 32(c)(l)(A)(i). Ordinarily, the taxpayer must have provided over half of the sup-
port for the child in order to claim the personal exemption for the child. Id. § 152(a)(1). How-
ever, special rules apply in the case of students, id. § 152(d), and in the case of a child of
divorced or separated parents, id. § 152(e).
130. Id. § 32(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(b)(2) (1980). The joint filing requirement does not
apply to an eligible individual who is not considered married under I.R.C. § 7703(b) (1988)
(relating to certain married individuals living apart). Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(b)(2) (1980). Cf.
Brooks v. Commissioner, 42 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) aa 78-5275 (D.S.C. 1978).
131. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(i) (1988). The term "child" includes an individual who is a son,
daughter, stepchild, or legally adopted child, a child placed with the taxpayer by an authorized
placement agency for adoption by the taxpayer, or a foster child (that is, any other child, such as
a grandchild for whom one cares as one's own). Id. §§ 151(c)(3), 152(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.151-3(a)
(1963).
132. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(B) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43- 2(c)(l)(i)(A) (1980). Also, the child must
reside with the taxpayer, in the United States, and the taxpayer must not be entitled to exclude
any amount from gross income under I.R.C. §§ 911 or 913 (1988). I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A) (1988).
133. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43- 2(c)(l)(i)(B) (1980). A surviving
spouse is an individual whose spouse died within the two taxable years immediately preceding the
individual's taxable year and the individual furnishes more than half the cost of maintaining a
household for the entire taxable year which is the principal place of abode of any dependent
children. I.R.C. § 2(a) (1988).
134. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A)(iii) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43- 2(c)(l)(i)(C) (1980). A head of
household is an individual who is not married as of the close of the taxable year, who is not a
surviving spouse, and who has furnished more than half the cost of maintaining as the indivi-
dual's home a household for the entire taxable year which is the principal place of abode of a
child or descendent of the individual who is unmarried or who is married and qualifies as a
dependent for whom the individual is entitled to a personal exemption or would be so entitled
but for a divorce or separation decree. I.R.C. §§ 2(b), 152(e)(2), (4) (1988).
135. I.R.C. §§ 32(c)(l)(A)(iii) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43- 2(c)(l)(i)(C) (1980).
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head of household only if the household in question is in the United
States. 136
3. Earned Income
The term "earned income" has the same meaning both for deter-
mining entitlement to the credit and for the phase-out of the credit.'"
Earned income includes wages, salaries, tips, and other employee
compensation, and net earnings from self-employment.'38 Earned in-
come is computed without regard to any community property laws
which may otherwise be applicable,' 3 9 and it is reduced by any net
loss in earnings from self-employment. 140
Earned income includes certain compensation excluded from gross
income, such as the rental value of a parsonage, 141 and the value of
meals and lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer. 142
It does not include amounts received as a pension or annuity. 143
Earned income also does not include interest, dividends, welfare ben-
efits, veterans benefits, or social security payments.'4
B. Advance Payment of the Earned Income Credit
Individuals who are eligible to benefit from the earned income
credit may elect to receive the benefit of the credit in their paychecks
throughout the year. To receive the credit in advance, qualifying indi-
viduals must fill out Internal Revenue Service Form W-5, the Earned
Income Credit Advance Payment Certificate, and give it to their em-
ployer. The employer is then required to pay the employee the appro-
priate advance earned income credit amount along with the
employee's regular wages. 145
1. Advance Payment Amount
An employee's advance earned income credit is based on the employ-
ee's wages from the employer for the pay period. The IRS publishes
136. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(B) (1988).
137. Id. § 32(b), (c)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(b), (c)(2) (1980).
138. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(c)(2) (1980).
139. Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(c)(2) (1980).
140. Id.
141. Id. Cf. I.R.C. § 107 (1988).
142. Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(c)(2) (1980). Cf. I.R.C. § 119 (1988).
143. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(c)(2) (1980). Nor does it include the in-
come of nonresident aliens to which I.R.C. § 871(a) (1988) applies. I.R.C. § 32(c)(2).
144. EARNED INCOME CREDIT, supra note 112, at 1.
145. Id. at 3.
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tables to help employers determine the proper amount of advance pay-
ment.' 46 Separate tables are provided for employees who are not mar-
ried (or whose spouses do not have an earned income credit advance
payment certificate in effect) and for those employees whose spouses do
have an advance payment certificate in effect.1 47
Separate tables also are provided for daily, weekly, biweekly, semi-
monthly, monthly, quarterly, semiannual, and annual payroll per-
iods. 48 For example, the 1988 table for weekly payroll periods shows
that a single employee (and a married employee whose spouse has no
earned income eligibility certificate in effect) is entitled to an advance
payment amount of 14% of weekly wages up to $114, which is a maxi-
mum advance payment amount of $16 per week. That maximum ad-
vance payment amount is phased out for wages in excess of $197 per
week.149 Similarly, for a married employee whose spouse has filed an
earned income eligibility certificate, the 1988 table for weekly payroll
periods entitles each spouse to an advance payment amount of 14% of
wages up to $57 per week, for a maximum advance payment amount
per spouse of $8 per week. Each spouse's advance payment amount is
phased out for wages in excess of $98 per week. 150
2. Electing to Receive Advance Payments
To receive an earned income credit advance, individuals must
furnish 5 ' an earned income credit advance payment certificate to their
employer. 5 2 This certificate is a statement in which the employee certi-
fies that the employee reasonably expects to be eligible to receive the
earned income credit for the taxable year'53 and that the employee does
not have an earned income eligibility certificate in effect for the calen-
dar year with respect to the payment of wages by another employer. 54
The employee is also required to state whether the employee's spouse
has an earned income certificate in effect. 155
146. I.R.C. § 3507(c)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. 31.3507-1(b) (1981). See, e.g., EMPLOYER'S TAX
GUImE, supra note 113, at 46-50.
147. I.R.C. § 3507(c)(2)(B)-(C) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(b) (1981). See, e.g., EMPLOY-
ER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 113, at 46-50.
148. EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 113, at 46-50.
149. Id. at 46 (Table 1(a)). See I.R.C. § 3507(c)(2)(B) (1988).
150. EMPLOYER'S TAX GUIDE, supra note 113, at 46 (Table l(b)). See I.R.C. § 3507(c)(2)(C)
(1988).
151. I.R.C. § 3507(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(a) (1981).
152. I.R.C. § 3507(e) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2 (1981); EARNED INCOME CREDIT, supra
note 112, at 3.
153. I.R.C. § 3507(b)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(a)(1) (1981).
154. I.R.C. § 3507(b)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(a)(2) (1981).
155. I.R.C. § 3507(b)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(a)(3) (1981). For this purpose, the
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IRS Form W-5 (the Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Certifi-
cate) is prescribed by the IRS as the earned income eligibility certifi-
cate. 56 Form W-5 must be prepared in accordance with its applicable
instructions, and the date called for therein must be set forth fully and
clearly.1 7 A Form W-5 is invalid if it is not completed or signed, or if it
contains an alteration or unauthorized addition.18
Generally, a new Form W-5 must be given to the taxpayer's employer
each year. 5 9 The certificate may be given to one employer only, even if
the taxpayer has multiple employers. Married taxpayers W-5 forms to
their respective employers. 160
A Form W-5 remains in effect during the calendar year until revoked
by the employee or until another Form W-5 takes effect. 6' If the em-
ployee no longer wishes to receive advance earned income credit pay-
ments, furnishing the employer with a new form W-5 revokes the old
one. 62 Also, if after giving the employer a Form W-5 the employee's
spouse's certificate is in effect if it will be or is reasonably expected to be in effect on the first
status determination date following the date on which the employer receives the employee's cer-
tificate. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(c)(3). The status determination dates are January 1, May 1, July
1, and October 1 of each year. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(l)(B) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(c)(4)
(1981).
156. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(4) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(b)(1) (1981). In lieu of Form W-5,
an employee can use any other form with identical provisions. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(b)(1)
(1981).
157. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(b)(1) (1981).
158. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(b)(2) (1981). Any Form W-5 which the employee clearly indi-
cates to be false by oral statement or written statement to the employer must be treated by the
employer as a certificate which is invalid as of the date of the employee's statement. In this
context, the term "employer" includes any individual authorized by the employer to receive
earned income credit advance payment certificates or to make payroll distributions. If an em-
ployer receives from an employee an invalid Form W-5, the employer must consider it a nullity
with respect to all payments of wages thereafter to the employee, and must inform the employee
of the Form W-5's invalidity. The employer is not required to ascertain whether any completed
and signed Form W-5 is correct. However, the employer should inform the district director of
the IRS if the employer has reason to believe that the Form W-5 contains any incorrect state-
ment. Id.
159. See I.R.C. § 3507(e)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(c)(1) (1981). If the employee has
not previously filed a Form W-5 with the employer for that calendar year, the Form W-5 will
take effect not later than in the payroll period following the date on which the Form W-5 is
furnished to the employer. A special rule enables a timely furnished Form W-5 to take effect at
the beginning of the calendar year for which it is filed. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(c)(1) (1981).
If the employee already has a Form W-5 in effect for that calendar year and wishes to change
it, a new Form W-5 will take effect on the date of the first payment of wages made on or after
the next quarterly status determination date occurring at least 30 days after the date on which the
employer receives the new Form W-5. However, the employer may choose to treat the new Form
W-5 as effective on the date of any payment of wages which is after the date on which the new
Form W-5 was received. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(1)(B) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(c)(2) (1981).
160. I.R.C. § 3507(b) (1988).
161. Id. § 3507(e)(2); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(d)(1) (1981).
162. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(3)(A) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(d)(2)(i) (1981).
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situation changes, such that the employee no longer qualifies for the
earned income credit, the employee must give the employer a new Form
W-5 within ten days after first learning of the change in circum-
stances. 63 If, after an employee has furnished a Form W-5 stating that
another Form W-5 is in effect for the spouse of the employee, the
spouse's Form W-5 is no longer in effect, and the employee may fur-
nish the employer with a new Form W-5 reflecting this change of cir-
cumstances. 164
3. Employer Duties
In general, if an employee has filed a Form W-5, the employer must
pay the advance earned income credit amount to that employer along
with the regular wages.1 65 An employer is not required to pay advance
earned income credit amounts unless the employee's wages are other-
wise subject to either income tax withholding or employee FICA
taxes.'6 Also, employers are not required to pay advance earned in-
come credit amounts to agricultural workers paid on a daily basis.' 67
Finally, an employer should stop making advance payments to an em-
ployee after that employee's earned income reaches the phase-out ceil-
ing for the year. 6'
Payments of advance earned income credit amounts by an employer
are not treated as compensation. 69 Rather, the employer treats these
payments as the employer's liability for quarterly employment taxes.' 70
163. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(3)(A) (1988). The employer is not required to ascertain whether any
employee has experienced a change of circumstances which necessitates the employee filing a new
Form W-5. However, the employer should inform the district director of the IRS if the employer
has reason to believe that an employee has experienced a change of circumstances and the em-
ployee does not deliver a new Form W-5 to the employee within 10 days thereafter. Treas. Reg. §
31.3507-2(d)(2)(i)(B) (1981).
164. I.R.C. § 3507(e)(3)(B) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(d)(2)(ii) (1981).
165. I.R.C. § 3507(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(a)(1) (1981). In the case of an individ-
ual who receives wages subject to income tax withholding, the term "employee" has the same
meaning as set forth in I.R.C. § 3401(c), and the term "wages" has the same meaning as set
forth in I.R.C. §§ 3401(a) and 3402(e). If an individual does not receive wages which are subject
to income tax withholding, but does receive wages which are subject to employee FICA taxes,
the term "employee" has the same meaning as set forth in I.R.C. § 3121(d), and the term
"wages" has the same meaning as set forth in I.R.C. § 3121(a). Treas. Reg. 31.3507-1(a)(i), (ii)
(1988).
166. I.R.C. § 3507(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(a)(1) (1981).
167. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(a)(1)(ii) (1981). An "agricultural worker" is an employee who
performs "agricultural labor," as that term is defined in I.R.C. § 3121(g).
168. See Treas. Reg. § 1.3507-1(b) (1988); EARNED INCOME CREDIT, supra note 112, at 3. Cf.
Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-2(d)(2)(i)(B) (1981).
169. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(l)(A) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(1)(i) (1981).
170. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(l)(B) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(1)(i) (1981). These payments
are treated as coming first, from the aggregate amount, with respect to all employees, required
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The amounts of earned income credit paid to employees are treated as
if paid directly to the Treasury Department on pay day.'' The em-
ployer reports the payment and treatment of the advance amounts on
the applicable quarterly employment tax return. 72
If the amount due of earned income advance payments exceeds the
amount of employment taxes due, then the employer may reduce each
advance payment pro rata.'7 Alternatively, the employer may elect to
pay all earned income advance amounts in full and claim a refund for
the additional amounts paid, 74 or have the additional amounts paid ap-
plied against the employer's liability for employment taxes for the fol-
lowing reporting period."' In general, the failure of an employer to
timely pay an employee all or any part of an advance earned income
credit amount, for all purposes including penalties, is treated as a fail-
ure by the employer to deduct and withhold taxes as of that time. 76
Finally, since 1987, employers have been required to notify employ-
ees whose wages are not subject to income tax withholding that they
may be eligible for a refund of the earned income credit. 77 The notice
must be in writing and should be provided to the employee within one
week of the date that the employee is furnished with IRS Form W-2,
wage and tax statement. 78 The IRS provides a notice form. 79
4. Recipients Must File Income Tax Returns
Every individual who receives advance payment of the earned income
credit is required to file an income tax return for the year. 18 The tax-
to be deducted and withheld for the payroll period for income tax; second, from the aggregate
amount, with respect to all employees, required to be deducted and withheld for the payroll
period for FICA tax; and third, from the aggregate amount of the FICA taxes imposed on the
employer. Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(1)(i) (1981).
171. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(1)(i) (1981).
172. Id. An employer is required to report, inter alia, the total amount paid to each em-
ployee as advance payment of the earned income credit. I.R.C. § 6051(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. §
31.6051-1(a)(ii) (1981).
173. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(2) (1981).
174. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(3) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(3) (1981).
175. I.R.C. § 3507(d)(3) (1988).
176. Id. § 3507(d)(4); Treas. Reg. § 31.3507-1(c)(4) (1981). This treatment applies to the fail-
ure to pay an advance amount to an eligible employee regardless of whether the employee is
ultimately entitled to claim the earned income credit (in full or in part) on a return for the year,
so long as the employee has a valid Form W-5 in effect with the employer at the time when the
wages were paid. However, the IRS will collect the advance amount from the employer only if
the employer has not properly withheld and deposited all income taxes and FICA taxes applica-
ble with respect to the employee.
177. Treas. Reg. § 1.32-1T (1987). See also EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 18, at
27-28; EMPLOYER's TAX GurDE, supra note 113, at 12.
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.32-1T (1987).
179. Id. The IRS form is Notice 797 which may be obtained from the IRS. Alternatively, the
employer may use another form of notice as long as the wording is identical to the IRS form.
180. I.R.C. § 6012(a)(7) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.6012-1(a)-(2)(vii) (1981). U.S. Internal Reve-
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payer's Form W-2 must show the amount received in advance payments
for the year.' 8 ' Any payment advanced in a calendar year is treated as
an additional amount of income, and is reflected on the employee's tax
return for the taxable year in which the payments were made. 12
C. Participation and Cost
For 1986, more than 6.4 million families claimed the earned income
credit. I8 3 Also for 1986, the total of all credits claimed came to over $2
billion: $.5 billion toward offsetting tax liability, and $1.5 billion was
attributable to refunds in excess of current tax liabilities. I8 Somewhat
surprisingly, however, for 1984, the most current year for which com-
plete data is available, only about 10,000 families claimed advance pay-
ment of the earned income credit, and the total amount of advance
payments came to a little more than $2.5 million. 185
Table 1 outlines the estimated cost of the earned income credit for
federal government Fiscal Years 1987 to 1989.186 For federal govern-
ment Fiscal Year 1989, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget es-
timated that earned income credits totalling $5.5 billion would be
claimed: $1.6 billion offsetting tax liability, and $3.9 billion attributable
to refunds in excess of current tax liabilities. 87 The expected increase in
the cost of the earned income credit is largely attributable to the
changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. For example, the Tax
Reform Act raised the maximum credit that a taxpayer may claim from
$550 per year to $874 per year. 8
nue Service Form 1040 or Form 1040A must be used. Id. Thus, U.S. Internal Revenue Service
Form 1040EZ may not be used.
181. I.R.C. § 6051(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 31.6051-1(a)(ii) (1981).
182. I.R.C. § 32(g)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(e)(1) (1981). However, any such increase
in tax is not treated as an increased tax imposed for purposes of determining the amount of any
credit. I.R.C. § 32(g)(2) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.43-2(e)(2) (1981).
183. Selected Statistical Series, 1970-1988, supra note 17, at 82. See also Weber & Paris,
supra note 17; V. BURKE, supra note 8, at 69. For federal government Fiscal Year 1988, the
Joint Tax Committee staff has projected that the earned income credit will be claimed by more
than 11 million families. WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIEs WITH CHILDREN, supra note 16, at
243 (Table E-5).
184. Selected Statistical Series, 1970-1988, supra note 17, at 82.
185. U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOrME-INDWmUAL INCOME TAx RE-
TURNS/1984, at 18-35 (Table 1.4).
186. 1989 BUDGET, supra note 16 (SPECIAL ANALYSES, pt. G, at 44, 45 n.2 (Table G-2)). The
budgetary impact of the earned income credit may actually reach $6 billion in federal govern-
ment Fiscal Year 1988. See WELFARE PROGRAMS FOR FAMILIsE WITH CHILDREN, supra note 16, at
241, 243 (Table E-5).
187. 1989 BUDGET, supra note 16 (SPECIAL ANALYSES, pt. G, at 44, 45 n.2 (Table G-2)).
188. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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Table 1: Estimated Cost of the Earned Income Credit for Fiscal Years
1987-1989 (in millions of dollars)
FISCAL YEARS
1987 1988 1989
Tax subsidy 525 970 1,575
Outlays 1,410 2,895 3,895
Total 1,935 3,865 5,470
Source: U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 1989 (SPECIAL ANALYSES,
pt. G 44, 45 n.2 (Table G-2) (1988)).
III. TiE MECHANICS OF INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS
Over the years a wide variety of programs have been developed to
help the poor. Among them are public assistance programs, public em-
ployment programs, non-cash benefits programs, and the minimum
wage. Indeed, the federal government alone operates dozens of pro-
grams intended to help the poor. The resulting complexity and overlap-
ping bureaucracies, as well as the failure to solve the poverty problem,
have been a general concern. As a result, welfare reform is perennially
on the public policy agenda.
Many analysts have called for replacement (or at least supplementa-
tion) of the variety of federal and state programs with some type of
comprehensive income transfer program.8 9 An income transfer pro-
gram is a system that provides cash benefits to the poor. For example, a
negative income tax is a type of income transfer program. An income
transfer program can be said to be "comprehensive" if it replaces or
incorporates other programs. ,90
In order to understand how the earned income credit can become an
effective antipoverty program for the working poor, it is necessary to
examine various types of comprehensive income transfer programs. Ac-
cordingly, this section briefly outlines and compares the principal types
of comprehensive income transfer systems: negative income tax pro-
grams, wage subsidy programs, and income subsidy programs.
189. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
190. Comprehensive income transfer programs generally have: (1) a formula for computing
benefits; (2) a maximum benefit; and (3) a formula for withdrawal of benefits as income rises,
known as a benefit-reduction rate (or marginal "tax" rate). Together, these variables determine
the income level at which government payments equal zero and a family becomes ineligible for
benefits (the break-even point). Cf. SUBcoMM. ON FISCAL POLICY OF THE JOINT ECON. COMM.,
93RD CONG., 2D SESS., INCOME SECURITY FOR AMERICANS: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PUBLIC
WELFARE STUDY 132 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter INCOME SECURITY FOR AMERICANS].
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A. A Negative Income Tax
One way to provide benefits to the working poor would be by adopt-
ing a negative income tax.' 91 A negative income tax is a system of cash
transfers to families in which the amount of a family's cash transfer
varies inversely with the family's income: the lower a family's pretrans-
fer income, the greater the amount of the government's net transfer to
it. The food stamp program operates somewhat like a negative income
tax, since the amount of food stamps increases as income declines. 92
President Nixon's proposed Family Assistance Plan also was a form of
negative income tax.
Theoretically, a negative income tax program could be designed to
give every individual a taxable subsidy and allow the positive tax system
to recover any excess benefits. During the 1972 presidential campaign,
Democratic candidate George S. McGovern proposed just such a demo-
grant system. 93 Although such a program might be theoretically possi-
ble, it would be extraordinarily expensive; it would fail to adequately
target benefits to those who most need them, and it would require dra-
matic increases in the marginal tax rates of the positive income tax sys-
tem to recover the government outlay.'9 Accordingly, most serious
negative income tax proposals have built-in benefit-reduction compo-
nents which are independent of the marginal tax rates of the positive
income tax system.
Generally, two policy variables can define a simple negative income
tax. The target or break-even income level is the income level at which a
191. See, e.g., Arup, Structural Problems for a Guaranteed Minimum Income and Job
Guarantee Scheme, 11 FED. L. REV. 19 (1980); Asinov & Klein, The Negative Income Tax: Ac-
counting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 H~Av. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1970); Burtless & Green-
berg, Measuring the Impact of NIT Experiments on Work Effort, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv.
592 (1983); Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 678
(1969); Klein, Familial Relationships and Economic Well-being: Family Unit Rules for a Nega-
tive Income Tax, 8 HAxv. J. ON LEacs. 361 (1971); Klein, Some Basic Problems of Negative
Income Taxation, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 776 (1966); Klein, The Definition of "Income" under a
Negative Income Tax, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 449 (1974); Popkin, Administration of a Negative
Income Tax, 78 YALE L.J. 388 (1969); Rolph, The Case for a Negative Income Tax Device, 6
INDUS. REL. 155 (1967) (urging adoption of a "credit income tax" with $500 per person refunda-
ble tax credits and a 30% tax rate); Surrey, Income Maintenance Programs, 24 TAx L. REV. 305
(1969); Theobald, Guaranteeing an Income: A New Constitutional Right for the Developing
Post-Industrial Age, 80 COsONwEAL 603 (1964); Comment, A Model Negative Income Tax
Statute, 78 YALE L.J. 269 (1968); Note, A Program for the Poor: Negative Income Tax Reeval-
uated, 11 W ImI-TTE L. REV. 417 (1975); and sources cited supra note 23.
192. 7 U.S.C. § 2017(a) (1982).
193. See 143 CONG. REc. 11,799-801 (1972). Under McGovern's proposal, every American
would have been given $1,000 a year from the federal government; however, the grants would
have been taxable income, and higher proposed tax rates would have recovered much of the
benefits provided to those with moderate and high incomes.
194. See, e.g., Burby, Report/Complex McGovern Economics Plan Dissolves in Campaign
Heat, 4 NAT'L J. 1449 (1972).
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family becomes ineligible for benefits and the government subsidy
equals zero. The benefit-reduction rate (sometimes called the marginal
tax rate) determines the rate of reduction of a family's subsidy as the
family's pretransfer income increases. In a simple negative income tax,
the family's subsidy is the product of the benefit-reduction rate and the
excess of the break-even income level over the family's pretransfer in-
come.' 95 The maximum subsidy (sometimes called the guarantee) is re-
ceived by a family with no other income. A household's net (i.e., post-
transfer) income for the year is the sum of its actual income plus the
amount of the subsidy it receives.196
Table 2 sets forth a simple negative income tax with a break-even
level of $10,000 and a 500% benefit-reduction rate. Under such a nega-
tive income tax, every family would have net income of at least $5,000
per year. The maximum subsidy, $5,000, would be received by a family
with no other income; those families with the lowest pretransfer income
would receive the largest subsidies; those families with higher pretrans-
fer income would receive smaller subsidies.
Table 2: A Simple Negative Income Tax (NIT)
PRETRANSFER NIT NET ANNUAL
INCOME SIBSIDY INCOME
$ 0 $ 5,000 $ 5,000
2,000 4,000 6,000
4,000 3,000 7,000
6,000 2,000 8,000
8,000 1,000 9,000
10,000 0 10,000
B. A Wage Subsidy
Another way to increase the net incomes of the working poor is to
provide wage subsidies.' 97 A wage subsidy program (sometimes called
195. Algebraically, the subsidy received by a household can be expressed as follows:
S = m(B - I),forI < B, and
S = 0, for I _ B
where S is the amount of the subsidy to the household, m is the benefit-reduction rate, B is the
break-even income level, and I is the pretransfer income of the household.
For example, a simple negative income tax with a break-even level of $10,000 and a benefit-
reduction rate of 50016 could be expressed algebraically as follows:
S = .50($10,000 - I), for I < $10,000, and
S = 0, for I 2_ $10,000.
This simple negative income tax is displayed in Table 2.
196. Algebraically, the household's net income, I', can be expressed as follows:
I = I + S
where I is the amount of the pretransfer income and S is the amount of the negative income tax
subsidy.
197. See generally J. BISHOP, THE ADMINISTRATION OF A WAGE RATE Suasnoy (1977); A.
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a "negative wage tax") is a transfer program that provides cash bene-
fits to supplement the low market wages paid to certain employees.
Typically, the amount of the subsidy that an individual receives is
based upon the number of hours worked and the hourly wage level. 198
1. A Simple Wage Subsidy System
In a simple wage subsidy system, employee wages are increased by
an hourly subsidy from the government. Theoretically, a government
wage subsidy program could be designed to give every employee an
extra dollar per hour worked. Although such a program might be the-
oretically possible, like the negative income tax proposal, undoubtedly
it would be extraordinarily expensive and would fail to adequately tar-
get benefits to those who most need and deserve them. Accordingly,
typical wage subsidy proposals call for wage subsidies for low-income
workers and for a phase-out of those wage subsidies for workers with
higher wage levels. Thus, at least after a certain point, the amount of
the wage subsidy will vary inversely with the wage level of the worker.
Three policy variables define a simple wage subsidy system. First,
the subsidy rate is the rate at which wages are subsidized. Second, the
target wage level is the wage level at which a worker will no longer
receive a subsidy. Finally, the benefit-reduction rate determines the
amount of reduction in the subsidy as the pretransfer wage level in-
creases beyond a certain wage.199
BLINDER, TOwARD AN EcONOmIc THEORY OF INCOME DISTRIUTION 149-55 (1974); Browning,
Alternative Programs for Income Redistribution: The NITand the NWT, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 38
(1973); Kesselman, Conditional Subsidies in Income Maintenance, 9 W. EcoN. J. 1 (1971); Kes-
selman, Egalitarianism of Earnings and Income Taxes, 5 J. PuB. ECON. 285 (1976); Kesselman,
Guaranteeing Wages: A Modest Proposal, 89 COMMONWEAL 700 (1969); Kesselman, Labor-Sup-
ply Effects of Income, Income-Work, and Wage Subsidies, 4 J. HuM. RESOURCES 275 (1969).
See also G. FETHKE, A. POLICANO & S. WILLIAMSON, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL AND
QUALITATIVE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDITS (1978); Perlman, A Negative Income Tax
Plan for Maintaining Work Incentives, 3 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 289 (1968); Zeckhauser & Shuck,
An Alternative to the Nixon Income Maintenance Plan, 19 PUB. INTEREST 120 (1970).
198. Most workers are, in fact, paid by the hour or in a manner easily translatable into hours
of work (e.g., weekly salary). Problems relating to workers not actually paid by the hour (for
example, certain agricultural workers) are beyond the scope of this Article, except to suggest that
a similar production-type subsidy could be based upon some other measure of productivity (e.g.,
bushels of apples picked).
199. Algebraically, the per-hour wage subsidy received by a worker can be expressed as fol-
lows:
s = rw, for w :5 W
s = rW - m(w - W), for W <w <(r + m)W/m, and
s = 0, for w - (r + m)W/m
where s is the amount of the subsidy per hour to the wage earner, r is the subsidy rate expressed
as a fraction, w is the pretransfer wage level received by the worker, m is the benefit-reduction
EARNED INCOME CREDIT
Table 3 sets forth a simple wage subsidy with a target hourly wage
of $4.00, a 50% subsidy rate, and a 500o benefit-reduction rate. It can
be seen that the largest subsidy is provided to people earning the tar-
get wage and lower subsidies are provided to those earning either
higher or lower wages.
Table 3: A Simple Wage Subsidy
PRETRANSFER
HOURLY WAGE NET HOURLY
WAGE SUBSIDY WAGE
$ 0 $ 0 $ 0
1.00 .50 1.50
2.00 1.00 3.00
3.00 1.50 4.50
4.00 2.00 6.00
5.00 1.50 6.50
6.00 1.00 7.00
7.00 .50 7.50
8.00 0 8.00
In the absence of a wage subsidy, an earner whose only income is
from work will have income precisely equal to the product of the
hourly wage level and the number of hours worked during the year. 200
The total annual subsidy resulting from a wage subsidy is equal to the
product of the number of hours worked during the year and the
amount of the subsidy per hour. 201 Under a wage subsidy system, a
wage earner will have a net annual (post-transfer) income equal to the
sum of the pretransfer earned income and the total wage subsidy re-
ceived for the year. 20 2 For example, an individual working 2,000 hours
rate, and W is the target wage rate.
For example, a simple wage subsidy with a target wage of $4.00, a 50% subsidy rate, and a
500 benefit-reduction rate could be expressed algebraically as follows:
s = .50w, for w _s $4.00
s = $2.00 - .50(w - $4.00), for $4.00 < w < $8.00, and
s = 0, for w at $8.00.
200. Algebraically, this can be expressed as follows:
I=hxw
where I is the pretransfer earned income for the year, h is the number of hours worked for the
year, and w is the hourly wage level. For example, an individual working 2,000 hours a year at
$4.00 per hour will have an annual earned income of $8,000.
201. Algebraically, the total annual subsidy, S, can be expressed as follows:
S = w X s
where w is the pretransfer wage level and s is the amount of the wage subsidy per hour.
202. Algebraically, the wage earner's net annual income, I', can be expressed as follows:
I' = I + S
where I is the pretransfer income of the household and S is the total annual amount of the wage
subsidy.
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a year at $4.00 per hour under the wage subsidy system set forth in
Table 3 is entitled to a net subsidy of $2.00 per hour for a total annual
subsidy of $4,000 per year and total post-transfer income of $12,000
per year.
Table 4 translates the data in Table 3 into an annualized subsidy
based upon the assumption that the worker works 2,000 hours per
year. It can be seen that a simple wage subsidy system provides the
largest transfers to those with moderate hourly wages and the least
transfers to those with either no income or with high income.
Table 4: Annualized Incomes Based Upon a Simple Wage Subsidy
(2000 hours)
PRETRANSFER
HOURLY
WAGE
$ 0
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
ANNUAL
EARNED
INCOME
$ 0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
ANNUAL
SUBSIDY
$ 0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
NET
ANNUAL
INCOME
$ 0
3,000
6,000
9,000
12,000
13,000
14,000
15,000
16,000
2. More Complicated Wage Subsidy Systems
Varying the target wage, the subsidy rate, or the benefit-reduction
rate will make a significant difference in the cost, coverage, and la-
bor supply effects of a wage subsidy plan. 203 Also, while the subsidy
rate and the benefit-reduction rate can be the same (as above), this
is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, it is possible to have differ-
ent subsidy rates at different wage rates. For example, it might be
desirable to provide disproportionately larger subsidies to indivi-
duals with hourly wage levels below the minimum wage, so as to
provide greater assistance to those individuals who have especially
203. See, e.g., INCOME SECURITY FOR AMERICANS, supra note 190, at 142-46; A. BLINDER,
supra note 197, at 153-55. Economists use the term "labor supply" to refer to aggregate work
effort decisions of individuals, such as whether and how much to work. Generally, labor supply
increases when wages go up, as the increase in the wages induces more people to work and
induces individuals who are already working to work more hours.
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low pretransfer earnings (i.e., workers not covered by the minimum
wage).
It is also possible to have more complicated formulae to describe
the wage subsidy. For example, an "overtime wage subsidy" would
provide a wage subsidy only for hours worked in excess of some
minimum number of hours per base period (e.g., more than forty
hours a week). 204 Presumably, such an overtime wage subsidy would
encourage employees to work extra hours, or at least some mini-
mum number of hours. Alternatively, a wage subsidy system might
provide that only a limited number of hours might be subsidized
(e.g., no more than forty hours a week).
C. An Income Subsidy
An income subsidy system is a transfer program that provides
cash benefits to supplement the low incomes of some individuals. 205
1. A Simple Income Subsidy
As with a wage subsidy, a simple income subsidy system can be
defined by three policy variables. The subsidy rate is the rate at
which income is subsidized. The target income level is the level be-
yond which additional income will lead to a reduced subsidy. The
benefit-reduction rate determines the amount of reduction in the
subsidy as income increases. 20 6 Under an income subsidy system, a
recipient will have a net (post-transfer) income equal to the sum of
pretransfer income and the total income subsidy received for the
year. 20 7 Table 5 sets forth a simple income subsidy with a target in-
204. See, e.g., Kesselman, Conditional Subsidies in Income Maintenance, supra note 197.
205. See, e.g., INCOME SECUITY FOR AmsEcANs, supra note 190, at 146-49.
206. Algebraically, the total amount of the transfer under an income subsidy system can be
expressed as follows:
S = sI, for I _ R
S = sR - m(I - R), for R < I < (m + s)R/m
S = 0, for I _ (m + s)R/m
where S is the total amount of the income subsidy, s is the subsidy rate expressed as a fraction, I
is the pretransfer income, m is the benefit-reduction rate, and R is the target income level.
For example, an income subsidy with a target income of $8,000, a 50% subsidy rate, and a
50% benefit-reduction rate could be expressed algebraically as follows:
S = .501, for I _< $8,000
S = $4,000 - .50(l - $8,000), for $8,000 < I < $16,000
S = 0, for I > $16,000.
This simple income subsidy is displayed in Table 5.
207. Algebraically, the recipient's net income, I', can be expressed as follows:
F I + S
where I is the pretransfer income of the household and S is the total amount of the income
subsidy.
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come of $8,000, a 50% subsidy rate, and a 50% benefit-reduction
rate.
Table 5: A Simple Income Subsidy
PRETRANSFER
INCOME
$ 0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
INCOME NET
SUBSIDY INCOME
$ 0 $ 0
1,000 3,000
2,000 6,000
3,000 9,000
4,000 12,000
3,000 13,000
2,000 14,000
1,000 15,000
0 16,000
2. A Simple Earnings Subsidy
If the amount of the subsidy is based only upon earned income
rather than upon all income, then the income subsidy may be
referred to as an earnings subsidy. The reduction in the subsidy
could similarly be based on earned income or more likely on all in-
come. The earned income credit is essentially a simple earnings sub-
sidy.2 08
D. Income Transfer Programs Compared
A comparison of Tables 2 and 4 shows that a negative income tax
provides the largest benefits to those who have low pretransfer in-
comes, while a wage subsidy provides the largest benefits to those
individuals who work at moderate pretransfer incomes. Conse-
quently, a wage subsidy can be criticized for failing to target bene-
fits to the destitute who most need a subsidy. Nevertheless, many
economists favor a wage subsidy (at least for those who can work)
because they believe that a wage subsidy system is likely to promote
greater work effort on the part of recipients, whereas a negative in-
come tax system may lead to reductions in work effort by reci-
pients.20 9 Indeed, there is at least some empirical evidence to suggest
that negative income tax subsidies will result in reduced work effort
208. Cf. INCOME SECURITY FOR AMERICANS, supra note 190, at 146-49.
209. See sources cited supra note 197.
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by recipient families, 210 and in particular by second-earner
spouses. 21
Acccording to the economic analysis, cash transfers to individuals
have two types of effects on individual decisions as to labor sup-
ply.212 First, an income effect will arise any time an individual re-
ceives a subsidy. Generally, any cash transfer to an individual will
increase the demand for leisure relative to the desire to work, and
induce the individual to work less. Thus, the income effect is ex-
pected to cause receipients of negative income tax and wage subsidy
recipients to reduce their hours of work (although a wage subsidy
recipient actually must work to receive any cash transfer).
Second, there is a substitution effect because the relative prices of
an hour of leisure versus an hour of work change as a result of a
subsidy. The benefit-reduction rate of a negative income tax will re-
duce the value of earnings, and so make leisure more attractive. On
the other hand, a wage subsidy increases the attractiveness of work-
ing, because each hour of work results in more compensation than
the marketplace would otherwise have provided in the absence of a
wage subsidy.
Thus, under a negative income tax, both the income and substitu-
tion effects are expected to operate together as work disincentives.
For a wage subsidy, however, the income effect and the substitution
effect work in opposite directions, and it is believed to be more than
likely that the substitution effect will dominate; consequently, reci-
210. See, e.g., TiE NEW JERSEY INCOME MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT, VOL. II: LABOR SUPPLY
RESPONSES (H. Watts & A. Rees eds. 1977); Burtless & Hauseman, The Effect of Taxation on
Labor Supply: Evaluating the Gary Negative Income Tax Experiment, 86 J. POL. ECON. 1103
(1978); Hall, The Effects of Experimental Negative Income Tax on Labor Supply, in WORK
INCENTIVES AND INCOME GUARANTEES (J. Pechman & P. Timpane eds. 1975); Hall, Wages, In-
come, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force, in INCOME MAINTENANCE AND LABOR SUP-
PLY (G. Cain & H. Watts eds. 1973). See also Kosters, Effects of an Income Tax on Labor
Supply, in TAXATION OF INCOME FROM CAPITAL (A. Harberger & M. Bailey eds. 1969); Rosen,
What is Labor Supply and Do Taxes Affect It? 70 AM. EcoN. REV. 171 (1980). Cf. G. GILDER,
WEALTH AND POVERTY (1981).
211. See, e.g., Rosen, Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint Wage-hours Determina-
tion, 44 ECONOMETRICA 485 (1976). Cf. Hauseman, Labor Supply, in How TAXES AFFECT Eco-
NOMIC BEHAVIOR 27-72 (H. Aaron & J. Pechman eds. 1981); J. Hauseman & J. Poterba,
HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR AND THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper No. 2120 (1987)); Leuthold, The Effect of Taxation on the Probability of Labor
Force Participation by Married Women, 34 PuB. FIN. 280 (1978); Leuthold, Taxes and the Two-
Earner Family: Impact on the Work Decision, 7 PUB. FIN. Q. 147 (1979).
212. See generally INCOME MAINTENANCE AND LABOR SUPPLY, supra note 210; M. KILLING-
SWORTH, LABOR SUPPLY (1983); Kalachek & Raines, Labor Supply of Lower Income Workers
and the Negative Income Tax, in THE PRESIDENT'S COMM1ISSION ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PRO-
GRAMS, TECHNICAL STUDIES 159 (1970); Boskin, The Negative Income Tax and the Supply of
Work Effort, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 353 (1967).
19881
76 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:41
pients of a wage subsidy are likely to increase their labor supply. 213
Also, to the extent that effective higher wages act as a work incentive
to those receiving a wage subsidy and so result in their working more
hours, wage subsidization actually equalizes the distribution of pre-
transfer ("market") earnings. By contrast, because a negative income
tax reduces the work incentives of recipients and so results in their
working fewer hours, a negative income tax makes pretransfer earnings
more disperse. 214 There is also reason to believe that a wage subsidy is a
much more powerful redistributor of income than a negative income
tax.
2 15
Moreover, wage subsidies actually may increase employment oppor-
tunities for low-wage workers. 216 While increasing the minimum wage
might reduce the demand for labor by raising the employer's cost per
hour of employee service, 217 wage subsidies raise wages without actually
requiring employers to pay more for labor services or reducing the de-
mand for labor. Thus, by increasing the wages paid to low-wage work-
ers at no cost to the employers, a wage subsidy should increase the
demand for low-wage labor.218
Another advantage of a wage subsidy relative to a negative income
tax is that the poorest workers would gain by reporting rather than hid-
213. See sources cited supra note 197.
214. A. BLINDER, supra note 197, at 153.
215. Id. at 149-56. Blinder developed a complicated economic model to simulate the United
States income distribution. He then analyzed a variety of taxes and programs, and he concluded
that wage subsidies are more effective than negative income taxes in achieving income redistribu-
tion. Blinder further concluded that wage subsidies may be one of the most effective ways to
achieve a sizable redistribution of income.
216. Kesselman, Conditional Subsidies in Income Maintenance, supra note 197, at 14.
217. Whether raising the minimum wage actually reduces job opportunities is a hotly de-
bated topic. See, e.g., S. LEVITAN & R. BELOUS, MORE THAN SUBSISTENCE: MINIMUM WAGES FOR
TI WORKING POOR (1979); J. PETERSON & C. STEWART, EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF MINnMrm
WAGE RATES (1969); Brown, Gilroy & Kohen, The Effect of the Minimum Wage on Employ-
ment and Unemployment, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 487 (1982); Elder & Miller, The Fair Labor
Standards Act: Changes of Four Decades, 102(7) MONTHLY LAB. REv. 10 (1979); Goldfarb, The
Policy Content of Quantitative Minimum Wage Research, in PROC. OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH
ANN. MEETING OF THE INDUS REL. RESEARCH A. 261 (1974); Gramlich, Impact of Minimum
Wages on Other Wages, Employment, and Family Incomes, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.
ACTWIvTY 409 (1976); Leffler, Minimum Wages, Welfare, and Wealth Transfers to the Poor, 21
J.L. & ECON. 345 (1978); Levitan & Belous, The Minimum Wage Today: How Well Does it
Work? 102(7) MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17 (1979).
Congress is presently considering whether to raise the minimum wage. For example, bills in-
troduced by Sen. Kennedy (S. 837, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) and Rep. Hawkins (H.R. 1834,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)) would have subsequently increased the minimum wage to $3.85
per hour on January 1, 1988; and to $4.25 per hour on January 1, 1989, and to $4.65 per hour
on January 1, 1990. After January 1, 1991, the minimum wage would be indexed for wage
inflation. See also Clark, supra note 4.
218. Cf. Samuelson, The Taxes of the Poor, 108(2) NEWSWEEK 58 (1986).
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ing wages. 2 19 On the other hand, workers in the phase-out range of a
wage subsidy would still have an incentive to under-report wage earn-
ings. Another difficulty is that a wage subsidy provides a perverse in-
centive for employers and employees to collude in reporting lower
wages and greater hours than actually worked by the employee in order
to obtain greater government subsidies. Finally, because a wage subsidy
would only subsidize those who work, it is likely that separate pro-
grams would nevertheless be needed for poor single parent households
with young children, the disabled, and those unable to find work.
As with a wage subsidy, an income subsidy can be criticized for fail-
ing to target benefits to the poorest recipients. Yet, similar to a wage
subsidy program, income subsidies, and, in particular, earnings subsi-
dies would raise the financial return from work and so are likely to
provide work incentives for low-income individuals2 0 However, the
work incentive effects of income subsidies probably will not be as
strong as the effects of wage subsidies since income subsidies and earn-
ings subsidies are not as closely tied to work effort. Even an earnings
subsidy is based simply on total income from work, whereas a wage
subsidy provides a subsidy based almost directly on the number of
hours worked. Income subsidies and earnings subsidies, however, do
have the advantage of not requiring employees (and employers) to re-
port the number of hours worked.
Furthermore, as with a wage subsidy, under an income subsidy the
poorest workers would gain from reporting earnings. Again, however,
higher income workers would have increased incentives to under-report
their incomes. Finally, as with a wage subsidy program, an income sub-
sidy would not cover those who do not or cannot work and have no
other income, and so separate programs would be needed for them.
IV. TRANSFORMING THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT INTO AN EFFEcTIVE
ANTIPOVERTY PROGRAM FOR THE WORKING POOR
Under present law, almost any qualifying individual with low earned
income is allowed to claim the earned income credit. The credit is avail-
able to individuals with great wealth and to individuals who have low
earned income as a result of working relatively few hours at a high
hourly salary. The earned income credit would be a far fairer and more
efficient antipoverty program if it were structured to benefit only those
people who have low incomes, work hard, and are needy. In these defi-
219. This discussion follows INCOME SECrrY FOR AMERICANS, supra note 190, at 145.
220. Id. at 146-49. On the other hand, in the phase-out range, the benefit-reduction rate has
the effect of reducing the financial return from working.
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cit-spending times, the country can little afford a program that fails to
so target its benefits.Y
With relatively few changes, the earned income credit can be con-
verted into an effective antipoverty program targeted for the benefit of
the working poor.m First, the earned income credit should be changed
from an earnings subsidy credit to a wage subsidy credit. Second, the
phase-out of the credit should be more closely based upon economic
income and need. Third, a family allowance provision should be in-
cluded, and eligibility should be extended to childless couples and single
individuals. Fourth, the benefit-reduction (phase-out) rate should be
raised. Fifth, changes should be made to encourage more eligible reci-
pients to elect advance payment of the credit. Finally, the maximum
amount of the credit should be raised.
A. Convert the Earned Income Credit into a Wage Subsidy Credit
The earned income credit is essentially an earnings subsidy program
for qualified families. For 1988 the earned income credit provides a sub-
sidy of 14°0 of earned income up to $6,235, for a maximum subsidy of
$874 per year.m That subsidy is reduced by 10°%0 of the excess of earned
income (or, if higher, adjusted gross income) that exceeds $9,836, result-
ing in zero subsidy for families with earned income of $18,566 or
more.22 The taxpayers' net (post-transfer) income for the year is the
sum of their pretransfer income and the amount of their earned income
credit.3
221. For federal government Fiscal Year 1987, the deficit was more than $150 billion; for
Fiscal Year 1988, the deficit is expected to exceed $140 billion; and large deficits are expected for
years to come. See 1989 BUDGET, supra note 16, pt. 1, at 5.
222. Cf. Bourdette & Weill, The Impact of Federal Taxes on Poor Families, 28 TAX NOTES
1245, 1250 (1985); Samuelson, supra note 218; Steuerle & Wilson, The Taxation of Poor and
Lower Income Workers, 34 TAX NOTES 695 (1987), reprinted from LADDERS OUT OF POVERTY,
supra note 9. See also Welfare: Reform or Replacement? (Work and Welfare): Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Social Security and Family Policy of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 227, 262 (1987) (statements of Robert D. Reischauer, Senior Fellow, The Brook-
ings Institution and Robert I. Lerman, Professor, Brandeis University); Welfare Reform: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation of the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 557 (1987) (statement of Robert D. Reis-
chauer, Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution).
223. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
224. Id. Algebraically, the amount of a taxpayer's earned income credit can be expressed
roughly as follows:
S = 14% x E, for E < $6,235
S = $874, for $6,235 _s E _s $9,836
S = $873 - 10% (I - $6,922), for $9,836 < E < $18,566
S = 0, for E > $18,566
where S is the amount of the earned income credit, E is the amount of earned income for the taxable
year, and I is the higher of earned income or adjusted gross income.
225. Algebraically, the household's net income, I', can be expressed as follows:
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For taxpayers having only earned income, Table 6 sets forth various
amounts of earned income, the amounts of the earned income credit to
which families with such amounts of earned income are entitled, and
their resulting net incomes.22 It is clear that for qualifying families, the
earned income credit is an earnings subsidy program, albeit a small one.
Table 6: The Earned Income Credit as an Earnings Subsidy Program
ANNUAL
EARNED
INCOME
$ 0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
EARNED
INCOME
CREDIT
$ 0
280
560
840
874
868
668
468
268
68
0
NET
INCOME
$ 0
2,280
4,560
6,840
8,874
10,868
12,668
14,468
16,268
18,068
20,000
1. The Earned Income Credit Viewed as a Wage Subsidy Credit
With a few simplifying assumptions, the earned income credit may be
viewed as a wage subsidy credit for its recipients. First, assume that all
recipient families have a single wage-earner who works 2,000 hours a
year. Second, assume that the only income that each recipient family
receives is the earned income earned by that wage-earner.
Given these assumptions, the earned income credit is essentially equiv-
alent to a wage subsidy credit with a subsidy rate of 14% for wages up
to $3.12 per hour, and a 10% benefit-reduction (phase-out) rate for
wages over $4.92 per hour.227 The maximum per hour wage subsidy
credit would be roughly $ .44 per hour,221 and that maximum wage sub-
I' = I + S
where I is the higher of the household's earned income or adjusted gross income and S is the
amount of the household's earned income credit.
226. The credit would be phased out even faster if the taxpayer had income other than from
earnings, since the phase out is based upon the higher of earned income or adjusted gross in-
come. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
227. These numbers were derived as follows: the earned income credit equals 14%16 (.14) of
wages up to $6,235, and $6,235 divided by 2,000 hours equals a wage rate of roughly $3.12 per
hour. The credit is reduced by 10% (.10) of the amount of earned income (or adjusted gross
income, if higher) exceeding $9,836. Thus, the credit phases out when wages exceed $4.92 per
hour ($9,836 / 2,000 = $4.918).
228. Mathematically, the maximum earned income credit of $874 divided by 2,000 hours
equals $ .437 per hour, rounded to $ .44.
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sidy credit would be fully phased out for recipients with wage levels of
$9.28 per hour or more. 9 The total annual subsidy is the product of the
hourly subsidy and the number of hours worked per year. 20 That wage
earner will have net (post-transfer) income equal to the sum of the pre-
transfer wages and the total annual subsidy.23'
For various wage levels, Table 7 shows the annual earnings assuming
2,000 hours of work at that wage, and the amount of earned income
credit that a qualifying taxpayer earning that annual wage (and having
no other income) could claim. Column 4 of Table 7 translates that
amount into a per-hour subsidy. Clearly, for recipients working 2,000
hours a year, the earned income credit operates like a wage subsidy
credit of as much as $ .44 per hour. This result is particularly helpful to
those taxpayers who have elected to receive advance payments of the
earned income credit since they will receive their credit amounts in each
paycheck.
Table 7: The Earned Income Credit Viewed as
Credit (2000 hours)
ANNUAL
EARNINGS
$ 6,700
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
18,560
EARNED
INCOME
CREDIT (EIC)
$ 874
874
868
668
468
268
68
0
a Wage Subsidy
EFFECTIVE
HOURLY
SUBSIDY
(EIC/2000)
$ .44
.44
.43
.33
.23
.13
.03
0
229. Mathematically, the credit is fully phased out when income reaches $18,566, and
$18,566 divided by 2,000 hours equals a wage rate of roughly $9.28 per hour.
Algebraically, the per-hour wage subsidy received by qualifying families with a single wage
earner working 2,000 hours a year could be expressed roughly as follows:
s = .14 x w, for w :5 $3.12
s = $ .44, for $3.12 < w :s $4.92
s = $ .44 - .10(w - $4.92), for $4.92 < w < $9.28
s = 0, for w : $9.28
where s is the amount of the subsidy per hour to the wage earner, and w is the pretransfer wage
rate.
230. Algebraically, the total annual subsidy, S, can be expressed as follows:
S = 2,000 x s
where s is the amount of the subsidy per hour to the wage earner.
231. Algebraically, the wage earner's net income, I', can be expressed as follows:
I' = I + S
where I is the pretransfer income of the household and S is the amount of the household's
earned income credit,
HOURLY
WAGE
$ 3.35
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
9.28
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2. Converting the Earned Income Credit to a Wage Subsidy Credit
While the earned income credit provides most of its benefits to the
working poor because it operates essentially as an earnings subsidy
rather than as a wage subsidy, it frequently provides benefits to tax-
payers who may not really need or deserve them. This failure to target
the earned income credit to the working poor results from the credit's
failure to take into account the recipient's hourly wage rate or labor-
leisure choices. Converting the earned income credit into a wage sub-
sidy would better target the benefits to the working poor and increase
the work incentives associated with the earned income credit.
As structured, all that is considered in determining eligibility for the
earned income credit is the recipient's annual earned income (and, for
the phase-out, adjusted gross income, if higher). Consider a qualify-
ing individual whose only income for the taxable year is $5,000 in
earned income. Such an individual, with a subsidy rate of 14°76, would
qualify for an earned income credit of $700. One problem is that such
a $700 subsidy would be equally available to an individual who earns
$5,000 by working 1,000 hours at $5.00 per hour, to an individual
who works 500 hours at $10.00 per hour, or even to an individual who
works 100 hours at $50.00 per hour.232 Even worse, the earned income
credit can provide a greater subsidy per hour for high-wage workers
than for low-wage workers.233
Converting the earned income credit into a wage subsidy system
would ensure that the subsidy was in part based upon both a taxpay-
er's market wage rate and labor-leisure choices. Such a wage subsidy
credit would pay taxpayers whose earnings resulted from having
worked 2,000 hours a year a subsidy equal to the amount of the cur-
rent earned income credit. Table 7 demonstrated how the present
earned income credit would look if it were converted to a wage sub-
sidy credit that provided a wage subsidy of up to $ .44 per hour. Un-
der such a wage subsidy credit, an individual earning $5.00 per hour
would be entitled to a credit of $ .43 per hour, while individuals earn-
ing $10 per hour or $50 per hour would not be entitled to any credit at
all. As a consequence, the benefits of the earned income credit would
be better targeted to the hardest working poor.
The only change that would be required to convert the earned in-
come credit to a wage subsidy would be to base the credit amount on
the hourly wage of recipients, rather than on their annual earned in-
232. See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 222, at 703.
233. Id. The benefit would be $7.00 per hour to a taxpayer who worked 50 hours at $100 per
hour; $1.40 per hour to a worker who worked 500 hours at $10 per hour; but only $ .70 per hour
to a worker who worked 1,000 hours at $5.00 per hour.
19881
82 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:41
come. Relatively few reporting changes would be needed to accommo-
date such a wage subsidy credit in lieu of the present earned income
credit. Almost all employers are already required to report the total
amount of wages that they pay their employees for purposes of social
security taxation. 234 The only additional information that would be re-
quired for a wage subsidy credit would be specific information about
each recipient's hourly wage and number of hours worked during each
pay period. Most employers undoubtedly already keep that payroll in-
formation on hand for their own purposes.
Of course, under a wage subsidy credit, both the employer and em-
ployee, would have an incentive to understate the hourly wage and
overstate hours worked in order to maximize the government subsidy.
As a partial check, both the employee and employer could be required
to report wages and hours worked. Moreover, the existing penalties
for false reporting should deter most collusion. 235 Furthermore, the
opportunities for collusion would be limited by the fact that the credit
would continue to be phased out for higher incomes. In any event,
even the worst collusion between employers and employees really
would not result in anything worse than what already occurs under the
existing earned income credit in which hourly wage and hours worked
are ignored. 23
6
The more troublesome problem is how to handle self-employed in-
dividuals. Frequently, only self-employed individuals will even know
how many hours they actually spend earning income, and they would
have an incentive to understate their hourly earnings and overstate
their hours worked in order to maximize the subsidy. For example, a
lawyer working 100 hours a year for $50 per hour would have an in-
centive to report his or her income as if he or she had worked 2,000
hours at $2.50 per hour if that was needed to claim a wage subsidy
credit.
234. SeeI.R.C. §§3111, 3121, 6011 (1988).
235. See, e.g., id. § 6653 (additions to tax for negligence and fraud), § 7201 (attempt to
evade or defeat any tax), § 7206 (fraud and false statements), § 7207 (fraudulent returns, state-
ments, or other documents).
236. If conversion to a pure wage subsidy credit presents too many administrative difficul-
ties, an alternative approach would be to base the credit on both the number of days or weeks in
which the recipient worked, and the recipient's earned income for such a period. For example,
under a subsidy based upon weeks worked, each employer would report the number of weeks in
which each employee worked and their earned income for that week. An employee might then be
entitled to a maximum earned income credit of no more than about $16 for each week worked.
Such an approach, would at least limit the amount of the credit that could be claimed by an
individual who by virtue of a high wage rate was able to earn all of the qualifying earned income
in just a few days or weeks. Moreover, such an approach might be needed for those employees
who do not work for an hourly wage (e.g., certain agricultural workers). See supra note 198.
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Surely it would be overkill to deny the wage subsidy credit to all
self-employed people because of a concern over false reporting of
hours and earnings. 237 Self-employed individuals would, of course, be
subject to the various reporting penalties, and they could be required
to report their earnings quarterly, or perhaps even monthly or weekly.
Also, if the phase-out of the credit were modified so as to take into
account economic income and net wealth of recipients, as I shall rec-
ommend, it would be unlikely that taxpayers who actually have high
hourly earnings would be eligible for the credit since they would likely
have too much wealth to qualify for the credit. In any event, as with
employees, even the worst mischaracterization of self-employment
hourly income and hours worked would be no worse than what al-
ready occurs under the current earned income credit scheme in which
hourly wage and hours worked are ignored.
B. Base the Phase-Out on Economic Income and Need
Most welfare programs are means-tested; individuals are eligible for
welfare benefits only if they can demonstrate that they are needy. 23
For example, to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), a family must be "needy" as determined by state standards
and must meet a resource test established by the state within certain
federal limits.239 The earned income credit can be said to be means-
tested as well, since the amount of the earned income credit is phased
out for taxpayers with high earned or adjusted gross income; how-
ever, the means-testing feature could be greatly improved.
For 1988, the earned income credit is reduced by 10% of the
amount by which the taxpayer's earned income (or, if greater, ad-
justed gross income) exceeds $9,836; and if a taxpayer has earned in-
come or adjusted gross income of $18,566 or more, the individual is
not entitled to the credit.14 Generally, these rules operate to limit the
entitlement to those taxpayers with low earned income and low ad-
justed gross income, and hence a need for government assistance. The
means-testing feature is imperfect, however, since the phase-out base
does not properly measure income, and does not even consider
wealth.
237. Another alternative might be to deny the credit to taxpayers in certain traditionally
high-wage professions (e.g., lawyers, doctors) while allowing it for traditionally low-wage busi-
nesses (e.g., night watchmen, housecleaners, daycare providers).
238. One analyst looked at 74 different programs for the poor and found that 90% of those
programs had an explicit income test. See V. BURKE, supra note 8, at 15.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A), (B) (Supp. III 1985); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1986).
240. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
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For instance, neither earned income nor adjusted gross income in-
cludes the value of welfare benefits, pensions, and many other re-
ceipts. One can easily imagine a taxpayer with relatively high
economic income but low earned income and low adjusted gross in-
come who still can claim the credit. Consider, for example, a lawyer
who has retired and who receives $25,000 of interest on tax-exempt
bonds and earns $100 per hour by consulting 50 hours a year. Such
individuals would not be prevented from claiming the earned income
credit under the present phase-out mechanism since neither their
earned income nor adjusted gross income would exceed the applicable
limit. 241
If the purpose of the earned income credit is simply to offset social
security taxes for those taxpayers who happen to have low earned in-
comes or to provide work incentives to all taxpayers with low earned
incomes, then there is no real problem with allowing any individual
with low earned income and low adjusted gross income to receive the
credit regardless of need. On the other hand, if the earned income
credit is intended primarily to help the working poor, and we are con-
cerned about giving government largess to the middle and upper clas-
ses, then the credit would be far better targeted by expanding the
phase-out base to reflect need. Redefining the phase-out base would
be particularly important if Congress were to decide to extend the
earned income credit to cover more people or to increase the subsidy
amount.
If the earned income credit is to be needs-based, it would make far
more sense to phase-out the earned income credit based upon the tax-
payer's economic income. To understand why this is so, it makes
sense to examine the current earned income and adjusted gross income
phase-outs. Moreover, some consideration should be given to consid-
ering the taxpayer's wealth in the phase-out mechanism.
o
1. The Definitions of Earned Income and Adjusted Gross Income
The term "earned income" has the same meaning for the phase-out
of the credit as it does for determining entitlement to the credit.
241. Although tax-exempt interest is now a preference for purposes of the alternative mini-
mum tax, I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (1988), and a taxpayer's earned income credit is reduced by the
amount of a taxpayer's alternative minimum tax liability, id. § 32(h), because of the high exemp-
tion amounts in the alternative minimum tax, a taxpayer still can earn a good deal of tax-exempt
interest without incurring any minimum tax liability or having to reduce an otherwise allowable
earned income credit. For example, single individuals are not subject to the alternative minimum
tax unless their alternative minimum taxable income exceeds $30,000. Id. § 55(d)(l)(B). Conse-
quently, single individuals might not be subject to the alternative minimum tax unless they have
more than $30,000 of tax-exempt interest.
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Earned income generally includes wages, salaries, tips, other employee
compensation, and net earnings from self-employment. 242
Adjusted gross income is gross income less certain deductions. 243
Gross income generally includes all income from whatever source de-
rived, 24 including earned income; however, there are a number of im-
portant exceptions that differentiate it from what an economist would
normally consider as income. 24 In particular, gains are not ordinarily
included in gross income until they are realized. 246 Moreover, special
nonrecognition provisions provide that even certain realized gains are
not currently taxed. 247 Also, imputed income is almost never included
in gross income. 241 More importantly, there are numerous statutory
exclusions from gross income. For example, the Internal Revenue
Code provides an exclusion from gross income for amounts received
by gift or inheritance. 249 Current law also provides an exclusion of in-
242. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
243. I.R.C § 62 (1988).
244. I.R.C § 61 (1988).
245. The classic economic definition of income (also known as the Haig-Simons definition of
income) is as follows:
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights
exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question. In other words, it is
merely the result obtained by adding consumption during the period to "wealth" at
the end of the period and then subtracting wealth at the beginning. The sine qua non
of income is gain, as our courts have recognized in their more lucid moments-and
gain to someone during a specified time interval. Moreover, this gain may be meas-
ured and defined most easily by positing a dual objective or purpose, consumption
and accumulation, each of which may be estimated in a common unit by appeal to
market prices.
H. n oNs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). See also R. -AG, THE CONCEPT OF INCOM
N THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (1921). See generally COMPREHENSIVE INCO E TAXATION (J. Pech-
man ed. 1977); WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? (J. Pechman ed. 1980).
246. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). But see Shakow, Taxation Without Realiza-
tion: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1986); Note, Realizing Appre-
ciation Without Sale: Accrual Taxation of Capital Gains on Marketable Securities, 34 STAN. L.
REv. 857 (1982). Cf. I.R.C. § 84 (1988) (provides for taxation of unrealized gains if any person
transfers appreciated property to a political organization).
247. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1034, 1041 (1988).
248. See Marsh, The Taxation of Imputed Income, 58 POL. Sci. Q. 514 (1943). See also R.
GOODE, TaE INDIV DUAL INCOME TAX 117-25, 139-43 (rev. ed. 1976); M. CHiRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: A LAW STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 22-25 (4th
ed. 1985); Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to
an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 859, 880-85 (1974).
249. I.R.C. § 102 (1988). Many have suggested including such amounts in income for pur-
poses of the income tax. See, e.g., Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts
and Bequests in Income, 91 HAiv. L. REV. 1177 (1978). Cf. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Pro-
posal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967). The case for including amounts received by gift or inheritance
in the phase-out base seems even stronger. Certainly such amounts are readily available for the
support of families.
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terest on state and local bonds. 20 Furthermore, a vast number of em-
ployer-provided fringe benefits are excluded from gross income,25 ' and
current law provides many other statutory exclusions from gross in-
come. 2 Welfare payments and noncash benefits such as food stamps
also are excluded from grosi income by long-standing administrative
practice. 25 3
In addition, a number of deductions may be claimed in computing
adjusted gross income. 2 4 While most deductions are intended to take
into account actual expenditures that reduce a taxpayer's economic
worth, a number of the deductions do not fall within this category.
For example, in computing adjusted gross income, taxpayers may de-
250, I.R.C. § 103 (1988). While most tax-exempt interest is earned by taxpayers with ad-
justed gross incomes in excess of the phase-out ceiling, some rather well-off taxpayers may end
up qualifying for the earned income credit notwithstanding substantial tax-exempt interest.
251. For example, gross income does not include up to $5,000 paid by an employer to the
beneficiaries or the estate of an employee, if those amounts are paid because of the employee's
death. I.R.C. § 101(b) (1988). Similarly excluded are employee health insurance premiums paid
by employers for their employees and their families, id. § 106; certain employer-provided life
insurance benefits, id. § 79 (the cost of up to $50,000 of group term life insurance may be
excluded from the gross income of employees); employee awards for length of service or safety
achievement, id. § 74(c); certain meals and lodging, id. § 119; certain legal services benefits, id. §
120; qualified transportation benefits, id. § 124; certain cafeteria plan benefits, id. § 125; em-
ployer educational assistance, id. § 127; dependent care assistance, id. § 129; employee discounts
including free passes for airline employees, id. § 132(c); working condition fringe benefits, id. §
132(d); free parking, id. § 132(h)(4); on-premises gyms and other athletic facilities, id. §
132(h)(5); and certain de minimis fringe benefits. Id. § 132(e).
Pensions and other forms of deferred income present additional problems in defining a
comprehensive income base. In general, cash-basis taxpayers do not include an item in income
until they actually or constructively receive it. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(i)
(1986). Thus, compensation is not included in income until received, even if deferral of payment
was agreed to by the taxpayer who performed the services. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1961-1
C.B. 174. Moreover, the Code excludes from gross income employer contributions on behalf of
employees to qualified pension and profit-sharing plans. I.R.C. § 401(a)(l) (1988). Furthermore,
income earned by qualified pension and profit-sharing trusts is excluded from gross income until
actually distributed to covered employees. Id. §§ 402, 501(a). Similarly, gross income does not
include certain retirement pay for members of the armed services, id. § 122, or veterans' disabil-
ity, survivor, and pension benefits, id. § 104(a)(4). Most social security benefits also are excluded
from gross income. Id. § 86. Finally, the income earned on annuities purchased by the taxpayer
is not taxed to him until actually received, and when received, only the portion that represents
income, as opposed to return-of-capital, is subject to tax. Id. § 72.
252. Excluded are life insurance benefits paid by reason of the death of the insured, I.R.C. §
101(a) (1988); workmen's compensation payments and compensation for personal injuries or
sickness, id. § 104(a); combat pay, id. § 112; mustering-out pay, id. § 113; certain other benefits
for members of the armed services, id. § 134; rental allowances for ministers, id. § 107; the gain
from certain house sales, id. § 121; qualified scholarships, id. § 117; foster care, id. § 131; and
child support payments received, id. § 71(c). The payor of child support may not claim any
deduction for child support paid. Id. § 215.
253. I.T. 3447, 1941-1 C.B. 191 (superceded by Rev. Rul. 70-217, 1970-1 C.B. 12); U.S.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., Pun. No. 525, TAXABLE AND NONTAXABLE INCOME 24 (1986).
254. I.R.C. § 62 (1988).
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duct contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts.255 Self-em-
ployed taxpayers may deduct contributions to pensions, profit-sharing
and annuity plans .256 Accelerated depreciation 217 and similar types of
business tax preferences 25 8 are also deductible in computing adjusted
gross income.25 9 Also, business and investment losses are deductible in
computing adjusted gross income. 26 0 Moreover, business operating
losses from prior years may be deducted in computing adjusted gross
income in the current year. 261
2. Changes to Bring the Phase-Out Base Closer to Economic
Income
It is apparent that neither adjusted gross income nor earned income
is as comprehensive as economic income. Consequently, to better tar-
get the earned income credit to the working poor, the phase-out of the
earned income credit should be based on something like economic in-
come. 262 The phase-out base could be defined as adjusted gross in-
come determined without regard to most of the exclusions and
deductions outlined above. Moreover, imputed income and unrealized
gains also could be included in the phase-out base. Furthermore, since
social security benefits, noncash welfare benefits, pensions, and child
support all increase a recipient's well-being, whether or not they are
economic income, these factors also are candidates for inclusion in the
phase-out base. 263
A less comprehensive approach would be to use something like al-
ternative minimum taxable income as the phase-out base. 264 At least a
statutory definition already exists. 26 Alternative minimum taxable in-
come is adjusted gross income decreased by the alternative tax item-
ized deductions and increased by the amount of certain tax
preferences claimed.2 66 While not equivalent to economic income, al-
255. Id. § 62(a)(7).
256. Id. § 62(a)(6).
257. Id. § 168.
258. See, e.g., id. § 179 (election to expense certain depreciable business assets).
259. To the extent that these are deductible trade and business deductions they may be de-
ducted from gross income to compute adjusted gross income under I.R.C. § 62(a)(2) (1988).
260. Id. § 165.
261. Id. § 172.
262. Cf. Klein, The Definition of "Income" under a Negative Income Tax, supra note 191.
263. Alternatively, vis-a-vis welfare benefits, it might make sense to make the earned income
credit a categorical program; that is, recipients who elect to receive the earned income credit
might become ineligible to receive other welfare benefits. Alternatively, the earned income credit
could be reduced by 100%0 of the welfare benefits received.
264. I.R.C § 55(b) (1988).
265. Id.
266. Id.
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ternative minimum taxable income may be closer to that ideal, since
many tax preferences are added back into the tax base. For example,
tax-exempt interest is included in alternative minimum taxable in-
come.2 67 Also, depletion and depreciation deductions are limited so
that they more closely approximate economic depletion and deprecia-
tion. 268
The obvious problem with using alternative minimum taxable in-
come as the base for phase-out of the earned income credit is that
individuals subject to the alternative minimum tax are allowed to
claim a variety of itemized deductions in computing alternative mini-
mum taxable income. For example, home mortgage interest, charita-
ble contributions, and medical expenses are deductible in computing
alternative minimum taxable income. 269 These deductions are not al-
lowed in the computation of adjusted gross income, 270 and there is no
reason to allow these deductions in determining the base for phase-out
of the earned income credit. Accordingly, if alternative minimum tax-
able income is adopted as the phase-out base, it should be alternative
minimum taxable income computed without regard to these alterna-
tive tax itemized deductions.
3. Further Changes to Make the Earned Income Credit Needs-
Based
Even economic income may not be the proper phase-out base. It
may make sense to turn the earned income credit into a needs-based
program like typical welfare programs. 27' In that event, a net wealth
or resources test might be imposed to force individuals to utilize their
own resources before taking benefits from the government. For exam-
ple, Congress has set a resource limit for eligibility for Aid for De-
pendent Children (AFDC):272 A family is ineligible for AFDC benefits
if its net worth exceeds $1,000.271 In determining a family's net worth,
the family may exclude the value of its residence, a car (limited to
$1,500 in equity value), and certain items of personal property that
are deemed essential to daily living. 274
267. I.R.C. § 57(a)(5) (1988).
268. Id. §§ 56(a)(1), 57(a)(1) & (7), (b).
269. Id. § 56(b).
270. These deductions are not allowable in computing adjusted gross income because they
are not specifically listed in I.R.C. § 62 (1988).
271. See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 222, at 702-03.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (Supp. III 1985); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1986).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(B) (Supp. III 1985).
274. 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1986).
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While the AFDC resource test may seem harsh, it is appropriate to
have some type of resource test for the earned income credit. Other-
wise, some millionaires may be eligible to receive the credit. In prac-
tice, most resource tests will have little impact on the vast majority of
the poor since they hold so few assets. 275
4. Summary
It appears appropriate to expand the phase-out base for the earned
income credit to reflect both economic income and other resources
that are available for support of the recipient taxpayers. In this way
the earned income credit can be targeted to the needy and working
poor. Admittedly, expanding the phase-out base would make the pro-
vision and its application more complex, but it would do so primarily
for those with greater economic incomes and wealth. Individuals with
only wage incomes and no significant wealth would still find qualifica-
tion for the earned income credit fairly simple, and these are the very
people who should be targeted to receive the benefits of the earned
income credit.
C. Extend the Credit
If the earned income credit is to be targeted to help the working
poor, then it is logical that large families should get larger credits.
Also, Congress should extend the earned income credit to childless
couples and perhaps even to single individuals. Finally, Congress
should reconsider ways to limit the current implicit penalties on two-
earner couples.
1. Include a Family Allowance Provision
At present the size and rate of the earned income credit are inde-
pendent of the number of dependents that a taxpayer has. While the
credit generally is available only to taxpayers with at least one depend-
ent,276 no provision is made for a larger credit if the taxpayer has more
than one dependent. 277 Thus, unlike the positive tax system, the
earned income credit fails to accommodate considerations of family
size, and the greater needs of larger families are ignored.278 Many have
275. Cf. Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski, supra note 23, at 86-87.
276. See supra notes 126-36 for additional information.
277. Cf. FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 14.
278. See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 222, at 704.
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recommended that the earned income credit vary with family size. 279
Several countries provide cash benefits to families in the form of chil-
dren's allowances. 280
The positive income tax system controls for family size through the
mechanism of the personal exemption. 28 1 For 1988, the personal ex-
emption amount is $1,950.282 Generally, taxpayers are entitled to de-
duct a personal exemption for themselves and their spouse, and for
each dependent.23 Starting in 1988, the deduction for personal exemp-
tions is phased out for taxpayers with high incomes. 28
It is obvious that large families need more income for basic needs
than small families and single individuals. The poverty income guide-
lines explicitly recognize this fact. 285 If the earned income credit is to
effectively help the working poor, it seems appropriate to provide a
larger subsidy to larger families that can reasonably expect to need the
funds. One approach simply would be to base the benefit on the total
number of personal exemptions or dependents claimed. The benefit
279. See, e.g., ONE CHILD iN FOUR, supra note 9; Cuomo, supra note 19; LADDERS OUT OF
POVERTY, supra note 9; Bourdette & Weill, supra note 222; Samuelson, supra note 218; FEDERAL
TAx TREATMENT, supra note 16, at 14; statements of Robert D. Reischauer, supra note 222.
Bourdette & Weill suggest that the current structure of the earned income credit "contributes to
the disproportionately harsh tax treatment of large poor families." Bourdette & Weill, supra
note 222, at 1250.
280. See, e.g., Kamerman, Child Care and Family Benefits: Policies of Six Industrialized
Countries, 103(11) MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23 (1980).
281. I.R.C § 151 (1988). Over the years there has been a great deal of debate as to whether
the positive tax system should account for dependents at all, and if so, whether it should do so
through deductions or through credits. See generally Brannon & Morss, The Tax Allowance for
Dependents: Deductions Versus Credits, 25 NAT'L TAx J. 599 (1973); Brazer, The Federal In-
come Tax and the Poor: Where Do We Go From Here?, 57 CAni. L. REv. 422 (1969); Gotts-
chalk, Deductions versus Credits Revisited, 29 NAT'L TAX J. 221 (1976); Habib, Horizontal
Equity with Respect to Family Size, 7 Pun. FIN. Q. 283 (1979); Pogue, Deductions vs. Credits: A
Comment, 27 NAT'L. TAx. J. 659 (1974); Robinson, The Treatment of Dependents Under the
Personal Income Tax in Canada, 18 CANADtL.N TAx J. 44 (1970); Thirsk, Giving Credit Where
Credit is Due: The Choice Between Credits and Deductions Under the Individual Income Tax, 28
CANADt&N TAx J. 32 (1980); Sayeed, Choosing Between Tax Credits and Exemptions for De-
pendent Children, 33 CANADLAN TAx J. 975 (1985); Sunley, The Choice Between Deductions and
Credits, 30 NAT'L TAx J. 243 (1977); Turnier & Kelly, The Economic Equivalence of Standard
Tax Credits, Deductions and Exemptions, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 1003 (1984); Weidenbaum, Shift-
ing from Income Tax Deductions to Credits, 51 TAxEs 462 (1973); Weidenbaum, The Advan-
tages of Credits on the Personal Income Tax, 42 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 516 (1974).
282. I.R.C. § 151 (1988).
283. Id.
284. Id. § 1(g), (h)(1). Apparently, Congress felt that wealthy families did not really need
this benefit, especially since their maximum statutory marginal tax rates have been reduced so
dramatically.
285. The most recent poverty guidelines are $11,650 for a family of four, $13,610 for a
family of five, $15,570 for a family of six, $17,530 for a family of seven, and $19,490 for a
family of eight. Poverty Income Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4214. For family units with more
than eight members, an additional $1,960 is added for each additional member. Id.
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could be keyed into the personal exemption amount. For example,
since the 1988 personal exemption amount of $1,950216 is essentially
equivalent to a tax credit of $292.50 for taxpayers in the 15% bracket,
taxpayers eligible for the earned income credit could be allowed to
claim additional refundable tax credits of roughly $300 for each addi-
tional personal exemption. 28 7
A less costly variation on this approach would be to allow addi-
tional credit amounts only for children under age six. 28 Another vari-
ation would be to allow additional benefits only for each dependent
who is under age fifteen or who is physically or mentally incapable of
independent self care. 289
An alternative approach would be to increase the wage subsidy per-
centage for families with additional dependents. At present, a qualify-
ing family with one dependent is entitled to a maximum earned
income credit equal to 14% of earned income up to $6,235. Under this
alternative, a family with two dependents might be entitled to a credit
equal to 14.5% of earned income up to $6,235. This would amount to
a maximum additional credit per additional dependent of roughly
$300.
A problem with approaches that increase the credit amount is that a
higher maximum amount of the earned income credit would, of
course, take longer to phase-out and would result in a higher phase-
out ceiling. With the current 10% phase-out rate, each additional $300
credit would be phased out over a span of $3,000. Accordingly, if the
credit amount were to be raised, it might make sense to raise the
phase-out rate simultaneously.
Yet another way for the earned income credit to take family size
into account would be to raise the floor (and, consequently, the ceil-
ing) of the phase-out for each additional dependent without raising
the maximum credit amount. After all, it does seem a bit unreasona-
ble that in 1988 even a family of eight's earned income credit starts to
phase out when its income reaches $9,836 and is completely phased
out at $18,566 of income, which is even less than the $18,800 poverty
286. I.R.C. § 151(d)(l)(A) (1988).
287. Congress might want to replace personal exemptions with a system of refundable tax
credits for all taxpayers. For taxable years 1975 through 1978, there was a nonrefundable per-
sonal exemption credit for low-income taxpayers. I.R.C. § 42 (Supp. III 1975); I.R.C. § 141
(Supp. 1975); I.R.C § 141 (1976); I.R.C § 141 (Supp. 1977).
288. Bourdette & Weill made this suggestion, supra note 222, at 1250.
289. Cf. I.R.C. § 21(b) (1988) (expenses for household and dependent care services necessary
for gainful employment). Query why the current earned income credit is available to most low-
income taxpayers with a dependent, rather than just to those families who have young or handi-
capped children.
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guideline for a family of eight. To avoid this problem, the phase-out
floor of the earned income credit could be raised by $1,950 for each
additional dependent. For example, in 1988 the earned income credit
phases out between incomes of $9,836 and $18,566 for a qualifying
family with one dependent. Under the revised approach, the earned
income credit would be phased out between $11,786 and $20,516 for a
family with two dependents, and the phase-out levels would continue
to increase for each additional dependent.
The problem with simply raising the phase-out range is that such a
change would not actually increase the amount of the credit for any
families with incomes below the phase-out floor. For example, a fam-
ily with a single wage earner working forty hours a week and earning
$3.35 per hour would earn $6,700 per year and would receive no addi-
tional subsidy despite an increase in the phase-out range. Neverthe-
less, if the maximum credit amount were increased to take into
account more dependents, it might make sense to simultaneously raise
the phase-out ranges.
Regardless of which mechanism or combination of mechanisms is
chosen to account for family size, there would be few additional ad-
ministrative burdens. Tax returns already require taxpayers to report
any dependents that they claim. The current advanced payment certif-
icate does not require that dependents be listed, but it could be easily
modified.2 90 Employer accounting and advance payment of-the earned
income credit might be a little more complicated as advance payment
tables would have to account for family size, but this is really not too
difficult for computerized payrolls. Moreover, employers already have
to account for family size in withholding for most employees, based
upon the number of personal exemptions that they claim for with-
holding purposes.
If fraud is a concern, taxpayers could be required to report the so-
cial security numbers of any dependents that they claim. Starting in
1988, a taxpayer claiming a dependent who is at least five years old
will be required to report that dependent's social security number on
the tax return.2 9' A similar rule could require such reporting on certifi-
cates used to elect advance payment of the credit as well. The IRS
could then cross-check those social security numbers against other re-
turns to make sure that no dependent is claimed twice or files a sepa-
rate return.
290. Even if the policy choice is made to limit additional benefits to taxpayers with minor
children or children under age 15, the forms could rather easily accommodate those changes.
291. I.R.C. §§ 6109, 6676 (1988). See also EXPLANATION OF THE 1986 ACT, supra note 18, at
1286-87.
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2. Extend Eligibility to Childless Couples and Single Individuals
Under present law, only families with at least one dependent are
eligible for the earned income credit, 292 yet many single individuals
and childless couples are poor. In 1986, 6.8 million unrelated indivi-
duals were poor. 293 These unrelated individuals constituted 21.6% of
the poor. 294 The earned income credit should be extended to them to
help alleviate the poverty and to encourage them to work. 295 Undoubt-
edly, Congress would not want to make the credit available to taxpay-
ers who are claimed on any other taxpayer's tax return. Also,
Congress might not want to let full-time students qualify for the credit
due to the somewhat voluntary nature of their poverty.
The credit would not necessarily have to be as large for single indi-
viduals as it is for couples or families with at least one dependent.
After all, the current poverty guidelines are $5,770 for a single indi-
vidual and $7,730 for a couple. 296 Under current law, if both a hus-
band and wife work and request advance payment of the earned
income credit from their employers, then each receives no more than
half of the total possible $874 credit. 297 A similar approach could be
taken for single individuals and childless couples. For example, a sin-
gle individual might be allowed a credit of no more than $437 ($874/
2). The allowance could be set up to base the credit on 7% of wages
up to $6,235, 14% of wages up to $3,117.50, or some alternative in
between. Similarly, a childless couple might be allowed a total credit
somewhere between $437 and $874.
3. Reduce the Penalties on Two-Earner Couples
The current earned income credit can impose a substantial penalty
on two-earner couples. 298 For 1988, the maximum amount of the
earned income credit that a married couple could receive is $874. If
292. I.R.C § 32(c) (1988).
293. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 6 (Table C).
294. Id. at 5 (Table B).
295. See, e.g., P. SHMe, POVERTY: TRENDS, CAUSES AND CURES 18 (Cong. Research Service
Rep. No. 84-9 EPW 1984); Samuelson, supra note 218. According to J. PacHMAN, FEDERAL TAx
POLICY 229 (5th ed. 1987), extending the earned income credit to singles and childless couples
would cost about $14.5 billion in federal government Fiscal Year 1988.
296. Poverty Income Guidelines, supra note 7, at 4214.
297. Em'LOYER'S TAX Guima, supra note 113, at 46-50. If only one spouse works and claims
advance payment of the earned income credit, that spouse can receive a maximum of $16 per
week as advance payment of the earned income credit. If the other spouse also works and files a
certificate, the maximum advance payment that either spouse can receive is $8 per week. See
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
298. See Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 222, at 704.
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only one spouse works 2,000 hours at the $3.35 per hour minimum
wage, a couple could receive the maximum $874 earned income credit.
If the other spouse also works 2,000 hours at the $3.35 per hour mini-
mum wage, the couple's earned income credit would fall to just
$518.299 In effect, there is a $356 surtax on the second earner's
wages.300 Moreover, the family's earned income would subject it to the
income tax.31 There is no particular reason why the family's subsidy
should fall so dramatically just because one's spouse also works. This
is a substantial penalty on two-earner couples.302
Another type of penalty affects two-earner couples electing advance
payment of the earned income credit. At present, a married individual
may claim advance payments of the earned income credit of as much
as $873 per year, but if that individual's spouse also takes a job and
requests advance payment of the credit, then each is entitled to receive
no more than $436 per year.30 3 In effect, one spouse's advance pay-
ment goes down when the other spouse takes a job and claims ad-
vance payment of the credit.
There is also a kind of marriage penalty relating to the earned in-
come credit.3°4 Currently, each head of household can qualify for an
earned income credit of as much as $874; but if two heads of house-
hold marry and combine their households, the married couple would
be entitled to a maximum single credit of just $874, not twice that
amount.
299. The couple's combined earned income would be $13,400 ($6,700 + $6,700). The maxi-
mum earned income credit, $874, would be reduced by 1007o of their earned income over $9,836,
or by $356.40 ($13,400 - $9,836 = $3,564; 10% x $3,564 = $356.40), leaving a net earned
income credit of roughly $518 ($874 - $356.40 = $517.60).
300. Id.
301. For 1988, a couple with one child could claim three $1,950 personal exemptions and a
standard deduction of $5,000. If their only income is earned income of $6,700, they pay no
federal income tax; however, if they have $13,400 of earned income, they would have taxable
income of $2,550, and they would owe $382.50 in federal income tax ($2,550 x 15% =
$382.50).
302. The marginal tax rate facing our hypothetical couple is the sum of the 1007 reduction in
the earned income credit plus the 150o marginal tax rate of the income tax for a total marginal
tax rate of 2507o. Steuerle & Wilson, supra note 222, at 704.
303. EMPLOYER'S TAx GuIDE, supra note 113, at 47 (Table 7). See also supra notes 146-50
and accompanying text.
304. Much has been written about the marriage penalty in the positive tax system. See, e.g.,
Moerschbaecher, The Marriage Penalty and the Divorce Bonus: A Comparative Examination of
the Current Legislative Proposals, 5 REv. TAx'N IrwmfLS 133 (1981); Note, The Case for
Mandatory Separate Filing by Married Persons, 91 YALE L.J. 363 (1981); McIntyre, Individual
Filing in the Personal Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C.L. REv. 469
(1980); McIntyre & Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income
Tax, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1573 (1977); Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN.
L. REv. 1389 (1975).
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While theoretically it is not possible to eliminate these penalties
without generating a kind of single penalty, some improvement is pos-
sible. Furthermore, if the earned income credit is converted to a wage
subsidy, there is some theoretical justification for preserving the first
spouse's full benefit even if the second spouse's income raises the fa-
mily's total income: it could be a powerful work incentive.
Alternatively, the phase-out range could be raised if both spouses
work. As under current law, if only one spouse works, the benefits
could be phased out at incomes greater than $9,836. If both spouses
work the benefits could be phased out at incomes exceeding $19,672.
Then, the earned income credit would be phased out only at higher
joint incomes. While this approach would greatly raise the floor of the
earned income credit phase-out, the phase-out rate realistically could
be raised much higher than the current 100, so that the phase-out
ceiling still could remain relatively low.30
4. Summary
In summary, the credit should be expanded to take into account
larger families, should be extended to childless couples and singles,
and the penalties on two-earner couples should be reduced. It is worth
considering how such an expanded earned income credit might look.
Such an expanded credit could be made available to all individuals age
eighteen or over and not claimed as a dependent by any other adult.
The members of the filing unit would be the filer, spouse, dependent
children, and any other people dependent on the filer or spouse. Mi-
nors (under eighteen) could be allowed to claim the credit if they are
married or have a dependent child and are not claimed by someone
else as dependents.
For example, each filer might be allowed to claim an earned income
credit of 7016 of wages up to $6,235, for a maximum credit of roughly
$437. If the filer and spouse both work, then each might be allowed to
claim a credit of up to 14% of wages up to $6,235, for a maximum
credit of $874 each. A nonworking spouse and each dependent might
qualify the filer for an additional $300 credit. Table 8 shows the maxi-
mum earned income credits that would be available to various types
of filing unit families under such a system.
305. At a 10% phase-out, a married couple's earned income credit of $874 would be phased
out over the next $8,740 of income. At a 20% phase-out, a married couple's earned income
credit of $874 would be phased out over just $4,370 of income.
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Table 8: A Hypothetical Expanded Earned Income Credit
TYPE OF FILER MAXIMUM CREDIT
Single person (working) $ 437
Head of household (working)
with one dependent $ 737 = $ 437 + $ 300
Married couple (only one $ 737 = $ 437 + $ 300
working)
Married couple (both work- $ 874 = $ 437 + $ 437
ing)
Married couple with depend-
ent (only one working) $ 1,037 = $ 437 + $ 300 + $ 300
Married couple with depend-
ent (both working) $ 1,174 = $ 437 + $ 437 + $ 300
Each additional dependent $ 300
D. Raise the Benefit-Reduction (Phase-Out) Rate
At present, the benefit-reduction (phase-out) rate for the earned in-
come credit is just 10%. This seems truly remarkable considering that
benefits from AFDC are phased out using a benefit-reduction rate as
high as 66.7%.0 6 Raising this rate would reduce the phase-out ceiling
of the credit. For example, if the benefit-reduction rate of the current
earned income credit as raised to 20% of the excess of earned income
over $9,836, the phase-out ceiling would fall from $18,566 to $14,206.
Thus, raising the rate would better target the benefit to the working
poor. Moreover, any savings achieved by raising the benefit-reduction
rate could be plowed back into the plan in order to raise the amount
of the credit available for those still eligible.
Unfortunately, benefit-reduction rates and positive tax rates are ad-
ditive. Thus, for taxpayers who face both the phase-out of their
earned income credit and a positive marginal tax rate of 15%, the ef-
fective benefit-reduction rate is 25%;307 for each additional dollar of
earned income, their earned income credit will be reduced by $ .10
and they will have to pay $ .15 of federal income tax.30 Nevertheless,
a benefit-reduction rate for the earned income credit as high as 25%
might well be reasonable. 309 Even when coupled with a marginal in-
come tax rate of 15%, the effective benefit-reduction rate would be
306. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(iv) (Supp. III 1985); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3) (1986); see also
V. BURKE, supra note 8, at 51-56.
307. See supra note 302.
308. Of course, this is still far less than the 38.5% maximum marginal income tax rate for
1987 or the 50% maximum marginal tax rate of 1986 and prior years. See I.R.C. § l(h) (1988);
I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
309. Indeed, the original work bonus proposal which is the precursor to the current earned
income credit called for a 25% benefit-reduction rate. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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just 40%. While high, even such a benefit-reduction rate seems quite
reasonable especially relative to other antipoverty programs.310
E. Improve the Advance Payment Feature
The advance payment mechanism already is ideally structured to
form the basis for a wage subsidy credit. Employees can elect to re-
ceive advance payment of the credit simply by filing a certificate with
their employer. Then, assuming that the employee's earnings are low
enough to qualify for the credit, the employer includes the appropri-
ate amount of the credit in the employee's paycheck.
The real problem is that so few employees elect to receive advance
payments of the credit. Indeed, only about 10,000 taxpayers claimed
advance payment of the earned income credit in 1984.1" Failure to
elect advance payment of the credit reduces the credit's effectiveness
as a work incentive since payments are not included in the recipient's
regular paychecks. Also, failure to receive the benefit throughout the
year reduces the disposable income of eligible recipients during the
year, instead, providing eligible taxpayers with a larger annual lump-
sum refund. For both of these reasons, it seems appropriate to en-
courage more eligible recipients to elect advance payment of the
credit.
The failure to claim the credit is probably due to the lack of under-
standing about the credit and the advance payment feature. Also,
some eligible individuals may actually prefer to receive larger refunds
each April. Still other eligible taxpayers may be concerned that while
they appear to be eligible for the credit at the beginning of the year,
they will not be eligible for the credit by the end of the year because of
unexpected income.
Obviously, steps need to be taken to ensure that every potential re-
cipient is aware of the credit and, particularly, of the advance pay-
ment feature. Employers could be compelled to inform all their low-
income employees about the advance payment feature, and low-in-
310. Of course, this analysis ignores any benefit-reductions that might simultaneously arise
in connection with a recipient being a beneficiary of food stamps or other antipoverty programs
as well as the earned income credit. In that event, the cumulative benefit-reduction rate could be
even higher.
Problems of program integration such as these are beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth
noting, however, that the problem of high cumulative benefit-reduction rates could be solved by
making the credit a categorical program; that is, by requiring individuals to choose either welfare
or an expanded wage subsidy credit. Those who worked (or could work) would be eligible only
for the credit; those who could not (or did not) work would be eligible for other antipoverty
programs. Cf. INCOME SEcURITY FOR AMERICANS, supra note 190, at 146-49.
311. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
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come employees could be required to elect whether to receive advance
payments. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 directed the IRS to include in
regulations a requirement that employers notify at least those employ-
ees whose wages are not subject to income tax withholding that they
may be eligible for the earned income credit.3' 2
Another possibility would be to make the advance payment mecha-
nism the exclusive way to claim the credit; taxpayers who failed to
claim advance payment of the credit would not receive the credit at
all. A better approach might be to provide a small bonus to those
taxpayers who elect the advance payment mechanism. For example,
eligible recipients who elect to receive advance payment of the credit
might be entitled to receive an additional one dollar a week of credit
over and above the current statutory amounts. Such an inducement,
albeit small, would encourage more eligible recipients to elect advance
payment of the credit. Similarly, if self-employed individuals continue
to be covered by the credit, special provisions could be made to enable
self-employed recipients to receive monthly or even weekly advance
payments of the credit. 13
F. Raise the Subsidy Rate
Many families are poor despite the fact that one or more family
members work. An individual working 2,000 hours a year at the 1988
minimum wage of $3.35 per hour would earn just $6,700 a year. That
is more than the poverty guideline for a single individual, $5,770, but
it is far less than the poverty guideline for a family of four, $11,650.
The current earned income credit provides a maximum subsidy per
family of $874 per year. Such a small subsidy can do little to alleviate
the financial difficulties of those families. If we are serious about
helping the working poor, we need a subsidy that helps them escape
the poverty line. 314
312. See supra notes 108, 177-79 and accompanying text.
313. Before moving on, it is worth noting that if Congress chose to adopt a comprehensive
negative income tax system in lieu of a wage subsidy credit, the advance payment mechanism
would be ideal as the basis for distribution of the negative income tax benefits. All employees
could receive their negative income tax benefits in their weekly paychecks. Unemployed reci-
pients could select a local bank to distribute benefits to them in a similar manner. Consider the
sources cited supra note 191.
For that matter, if Congress ever adopts a value-added tax or dramatically raises excise taxes,
it could temper any regressiveness by making a portion of the new taxes refundable to the poor,
and by adopting a mechanism to provide for advance payment of any refunds due. See U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 95, vol. 3, at 100-08; C. McLuRE, THE VALUE-ADDED TAX:
KEY TO DEFICIT REDUCTION? 38 (1987).
314. Even though a single individual working 2,000 hours a year at minimum wage would
earn more than the poverty guideline for a single individual, it makes sense to provide single
individuals with some credit to encourage them to work.
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Consider a modest program to provide wage subsidy credit for fam-
ilies whose wage earnings place them below the poverty line. Assume
that the program is designed to give such workers a wage subsidy that
would bring them halfway to the poverty line. Assume further that
each wage-earner works 40 hours a week, 50 weeks a year, for a total
of 2,000 hours per year. Further assume that each family has just one
wage-earner.
For a family of four with one wage earner working 2,000 hours, the
poverty level is equivalent to an effective wage rate of approximately
$5.83 per hour ($11,650/2,000 hours). Even this is a far cry from the
roughly $9.22 per hour average hourly earnings in the private sector
for April 1988. 315 Thus, subsidizing the wages of a sole-support, mini-
mum-wage worker who is least halfway to the poverty line for family
of four would require a wage subsidy of approximately $1.24 per
hour. 31 6 This is almost triple the current earned income credit which
provides a subsidy to such a family of just $ .44 per hour.
Consider a simple hypothetical wage subsidy credit for a family of
four with a maximum per hour subsidy of $1.20, 1 7 but with a 25%V0
benefit-reduction rate for wages above the minimum wage. 318 Table 9
displays this hypothetical wage subsidy credit system for various pre-
transfer wage rates. While less generous to taxpayers with income over
the poverty line, 319 the wage subsidy credit program displayed in Table
9 would have the advantage of bringing all families of four with a
single worker working 2,000 hours a year and earning at least the min-
imum wage almost halfway to the poverty level. Similar subsidy ar-
rangements could be designed for smaller and larger families. Overall,
the wage subsidy credit program outlined in Table 9 undoubtedly
would cost more than the current earned income credit. Nevertheless,
it is apparent that the current earned income credit does little to im-
prove the situation of the working poor. If Congress truly intends to
help the working poor, it should increase the subsidy rate in the
earned income credit, perhaps along the lines set forth in Table 9.320
315. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 35(5) EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS
105 (May 1988).
316. ($5.83 - $3.35)/2 = $1.24.
317. The $1.24 subsidy has been rounded down to $1.20 per hour to make the computations
and table more understandable.
318. Algebraically, such a wage subsidy credit can be expressed as follows:
s = $1.20 - .25 (w - $3.35), for $3.35 _s w < $8.15, and
s = 0, for w $8.15
where s is the hourly subsidy and w is the wage earner's pretransfer wage rate.
319. A more generous credit could have a lower phase-out rate or the phase-out could com-
mence at a higher pretransfer wage rate.
320. To subsidize the wages of a sole-support, minimum-wage worker up to the poverty line
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Table 9: A Hypothetical Wage Subsidy Credit for a Family of Four
(one wage earner working 2,000 hours a year)
SUBSIDY NET ANNUAL
HOURLY SUBSIDY NET PER YEAR INCOME
WAGE PER HOUR WAGE (2,000 HOURS) (2,000 HOURS)
$ 3.35 $ 1.20 $ 4.55 $ 2,400 $ 9,100
4.55 .90 5.45 1,800 10,900
5.75 .60 6.35 1,200 12,700
6.95 .30 7.25 600 14,500
8.15 0 8.15 0 16,300
G. Cost Considerations
It could be expensive to expand the earned income credit into an
increased wage subsidy credit that covers childless couples and singles.
Nevertheless, savings could be achieved by raising the phase-out rate,
for example, to 25%. In addition, some savings that could be used to
expand the credit could be generated by broadening the phase-out
base to take into account economic income and wealth and by struc-
turing the credit as a wage subsidy credit rather than as an earnings
credit.
Moreover, if Congress decided that the credit should be a major
antipoverty program for the working poor, dramatic savings could
come from excluding the working poor from other programs, such as
food stamps and AFDC, and from shifting the saved funds to an ex-
panded credit. For federal government Fiscal Year 1989, federal out-
lays for income security are expected to exceed $136 billion, more
than $10 billion of which is expected to be for family support pay-
ments alone.32' Shifting funds from other income security programs
would be a logical way to find the revenue to expand the credit. Simi-
larly, for federal government Fiscal Year 1989, the federal govern-
ment expects to spend more than $6 billion on job training and
employment programs. 22 Some of that money might be spent more
effectively on a wage subsidy credit than on job training and employ-
ment programs.
Analogously, for federal government Fiscal Year 1989, it has been
estimated that tax expenditures for education, training, employment,
for a family of four would require a wage subsidy of approximately $2.25 per hour. Mathemati-
cally, the $11,650 poverty guideline divided by 2,000 hours is $5.83 per hour, and $5.83 - $3.35
= $2.48.
321. 1989 BUDGET, supra note 16, ch. 5, at 117, 118.
322. Id. at 101.
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and social services will be the equivalent of an outlay exceeding $20
billion, and that tax expenditures for income security (other than the
earned income credit) will be the equivalent of an outlay exceeding
$78 billion.3 23 It would make sense to repeal some of these tax expen-
diture provisions and channel the resulting savings into an expanded
wage subsidy credit.
V. CONCLUSION
The earned income credit has grown significantly since its adoption
in 1975. As structured, it can form the basis for an effective antipov-
erty program for the working poor. Relatively few changes would be
needed to accomplish this result.
First, the earned income credit would be better targeted to benefit
the working poor if it were converted to a wage subsidy credit. Sec-
ond, the earned income credit also would be better targeted to benefit
the working poor if the phase-out base of the credit was more closely
based upon economic income and need. Third, serious thought should
be given to expanding the credit to cover childless couples and single
individuals and to increasing the amount of the credit for larger fami-
lies. Fourth, serious consideration should be given to raising the bene-
fit-reduction (phase-out) rate. Fifth, changes should be made to
encourage more taxpayers to elect advance payment of the earned in-
come credit. Lastly, if Congress truly wants to help the working poor,
then it should endeavor to find revenues to enable it to raise the
amount of the credit.
323. Id. at SPEcIAL ANALYSES, pt. G, at 38-39. For example, the exclusion for employer-
provided educational assistance is estimated to cost more than $3 billion per year, and the net
exclusion of pension contributions and pension earnings is estimated to cost more than $72 bil-
lion per year.
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